1 2 3	BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General ALBERT NORMAN SHELDEN, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General MICHELE R. VAN GELDEREN, Bar No. 171931 Deputy Attorney General						
5	300 So. Spring Street, Suite 500 Los Angeles, California 90013						
6							
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff, the People of the State of California						
8							
9	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA						
10	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES						
11	SOUTHEAST DISTRICT						
12	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	CASE	NO.				
13	Plaintiff,	(1)	THE PEOPLE'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR (A)				
<ul><li>14</li><li>15</li></ul>	V.		TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE:				
16	CALIFORNIA ALTERNATIVE HIGH SCHOOL, a California corporation;		PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND (B) APPLICATION FOR				
17	CALIFORNIA ALTERNATIVE ADULT HIGH SCHOOL, a California corporation; WEST SIDE EDUCATION CORPORATION, a		APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY				
18 19	California corporation; DANIEL A.D. GOSSAI a.k.a. DEONAUTH GOSSAI, an individual;		APPOINTMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONFIRMED;				
20	JANET H. GOSSAI, an individual; DAVID L. SOTO, an individual; NOEL BRITO, an individual; FABRICIO SANDOVAL, an individual; JANIRA JACOBS, an individual; and DOES 1 THROUGH 100, inclusive,	(2)	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;				
21		(3)	SUPPORTING				
22	Defendants.	(5)	DECLARATIONS (Four volumes, filed under separate				
23	Dorondanio		cover);				
24		(4)	[PROPOSED] ORDERS (Two orders, lodged under				
25			separate cover).				
26			E ACTION FILED: August 2, 2004 L DATE: None set				
27		•					
28							

People's Application for TRO

26

27

made any of the above representations.

Defendants have made any of the above representations.

8.

Accepting money or other consideration from any consumer to whom

- B. The application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction is made on the grounds that:
- 1. Defendants have violated, and are continuing to violate, Business and Professions Code sections 17200 (prohibiting unfair business practices) and 17500 (prohibiting false or misleading statements). Defendants unlawfully solicit consumers to enroll in Defendants' ten-week, thirty-hour course by misrepresenting that consumers who complete the course will earn a high school diploma that can be used for various educational and vocational purposes.
- 2. The relief that the People request is necessary to protect consumers from being irreparably harmed by Defendants' misconduct.
- II. Request for appointment of a receiver; nomination of David J. Pasternak, Esq.
- A. The People further apply to the Court for appointment of a receiver and an order to show cause why the appointment should not be confirmed. The People request a receiver to take possession of and to manage Defendants' business and related assets. The application for appointment of a receiver is made on the grounds that: (1) the Attorney General has a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits at trial in establishing that Defendants obtained real or personal property by unlawful means; and (2) the appointment of a receiver would facilitate the maintenance, preservation, operation, or recovery of that property for a restitutionary purpose. (Gov. Code, § 12527, subd. (b).) This application is also made on the grounds that appointment of a receiver will prevent Defendants from engaging in certain unlawful practices in violation Business and Professions Code, sections 17200 and 17500, and will aid in the restoration money or property that was acquired by means of such violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203, 17535.)
- B. The People request appointment of a receiver ex parte. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 1900.) The People have submitted declarations and attached exhibits showing the following:
  - 1. Nature of emergency/irreparable injury:
- a. Defendants have refused to comply with the law and court orders.

  Among other things, Defendants have continued to violate consumer protection laws, causing irreparable injury to consumers, despite this Court's entry of a permanent injunction. Defendants

26

1

5

9

11

13

17

19

21

23

24

25

C. The People nominate David J. Pasternak, Esq. to serve as Receiver. Mr. Pasternak's qualifications are discussed in his declaration and attached exhibits, submitted concurrently with this application.

injunction, as well as in compliance any additional injunction that this Court may issue.

1	to destroy documents before the Court has been able to enter an appropriate order to prevent			
2	such conduct. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 379, subd. (a)(3).)			
3				
4	No bond is required of the People. (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.220.)			
5				
6	This application is based on this application and memorandum of points and authorities,			
7	the complaint on file herein, the declarations filed in support of this application and exhibits			
8	thereto, any other documents that may be filed, and such evidence and argument that may be			
9	presented at or before the hearing, or of which the Court may take judicial notice.			
10	DATED: August 2, 2004	BILL LOCKYER,		
11	DiffED. August 2, 2004	Attorney General ALBERT NORMAN SHELDEN,		
12				
13				
14				
15		By MICHELE R. VAN GELDEREN		
16		Attorneys for Plaintiff,		
17		the People of the State of California		
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
	vii			
	People's Application for TRO			

### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants have made a lucrative career of exploiting immigrants' dreams of a better life through education. Operating from their headquarters in Los Angeles County, they run the deceptively-named "California Alternative High School" ("CAHS") at 78 locations across the country. Defendants tailor their sales pitch to adult Latino immigrants, claiming that the founders of CAHS are fulfilling a divine mission to help Latinos escape poverty by earning a high school diploma. To gain consumers' confidence, Defendants frequently hold classes at churches with the unwitting assistance of well-meaning clergy and congregants.

Defendants charge from \$450 to \$1,450 for a ten-week, thirty-hour course. According to Defendants, if consumers complete the program, they will receive a high school diploma that will allow them, among other things, to go to an accredited college, to receive financial aid, or to get a job that requires a high school diploma. At the end of the course, Defendants require the consumer to rent a cap and gown, conduct a sham "commencement ceremony" and even issue "official transcripts" to enhance the illusion that consumers actually have earned a high school diploma. At the end of the course, however, consumers are left with a useless certificate and less money to spend on legitimate high school or vocational programs.

Numerous governmental entities and consumer victims across the country have taken legal action to stop Defendants' systematic and unrepentant exploitation of these consumers. As a result of that litigation, a permanent injunction has been entered by this Court, which previously had entered a preliminary injunction, and two temporary injunctions have been entered in other states.

These legal actions have had no discernible effect on Defendants' conduct. In Los Angeles County, elsewhere in the state and across the country, Defendants continue to mislead consumers into enrolling in CAHS; they take consumers' money, waste weeks of their time, put them through a meaningless commencement ceremony in front of proud family and friends -- which in retrospect is humiliating to those consumers -- and leave them with a "diploma" that is useless in achieving consumers' educational and employment goals.

The People submit that forceful action is necessary to prevent Defendants' continued practice of preying on these vulnerable consumers in California. Therefore, the People request that the Court: (1) enter a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendants from engaging in conduct that is likely to be proven unlawful; (2) appoint a receiver to manage Defendants' high school business and its assets, both to protect consumers from further irreparable harm and to prevent Defendants from dissipating assets that could be used to make restitution to consumers; and (3) enter an order freezing certain of Defendants' assets, which, likewise, can used for consumer restitution.

#### II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

#### A. The Defendants.

Defendant Daniel A.D. Gossai is the "principal" of CAHS. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at p. 7, ¶13, Exh. 18; Porbanic Dec., ¶6; Yepez Dec., ¶3.) He is in charge of the CAHS materials, curriculum and teacher training. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.13, ¶13.12.) He also confers the diplomas and is a featured speaker at CAHS's "commencements." (Garcia Dec., ¶11.13, ¶8(b), Exh. 8; Yepez Dec., ¶5, Exh. 3; Roa Dec., ¶7.) Mr. Gossai is the president and chief executive officer of defendant California Adult High School. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶3(a), Exh. 21.) Mr. Gossai is the incorporator and agent for service of process of defendant California Alternative Adult High School; Mr. Gossai has not filed documents with the Secretary of State designating the corporate officers. (*Id.* ¶3(b), Exh. 22.) Mr. Gossai works out of his office on State Street in Huntington Park. (Garcia Dec., ¶7, Exh. 6, ¶13, Exh. 18.)

Defendant Janet Gossai acts as a repository of the assets that Mr. Gossai acquires via the CAHS scheme, apparently to protect those assets from consumer victims of CAHS and other judgment creditors. He transfers to her, and she holds in her name, property purchased with funds taken from the victims of the CAHS scheme. Mr. Gossai, however continues to make use of, and to exercise control over, that property. For example, Mr. Gossai quitclaimed to Mrs. Gossai his interest in his Huntington Park office, from which he continues to run CAHS. (*Infra* at p. 13.)

			1
			J
	•	4	

ا ء ۔

Defendant West Side Education Corporation ("West Side") purchased the rights to the CAHS program about four years ago, and has been actively expanding the program to locations throughout California and in other states. (Garcia Dec., ¶12.1.) There are now 78 CAHS locations across the country at which Defendants conduct the CAHS program. (*Id.* ¶11.13, ¶12.1.) Defendant David L. Soto is the president of West Side and is involved in CAHS's business operations, often traveling to CAHS sites across the country. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶3(c), Exh. 23; Garcia Dec., ¶11.13, ¶12.1.) Noel Brito, the director of West Side, manages the business's finances. (*Id.* ¶12, Exh. 16; ¶12.1.) He works out of West Side's office at 8212 Alondra Boulevard in Paramount. (Garcia Dec., ¶12, Exh. 16.) Mr. Gossai remains actively involved in the scheme in his role as "principal." (*Supra* at p. 2.)

Defendant Fabricio Sandoval is the director of admissions for CAHS. (Garcia Dec., ¶15, Exh. 19.) He also teaches CAHS classes. (*Id.*, ¶8, Exh. 8 at p. 2; Acevedo Dec., ¶5.) Often, when Daniel Gossai wants to address Spanish-speaking students, such as to deliver a "commencement address," Mr. Sandoval acts as the translator. (Roa Dec., ¶7.)

Defendant Janira Jacobs is an administrator and an instructor for CAHS at its "Victory Outreach" center in La Puente, California. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.)

### B. Defendants' high school diploma scheme.

#### 1. The solicitation.

Defendants target Latinos. For example, Mr. Gossai, the "principal" of CAHS, claims: "I am committed in a special way to help the Hispanic population, and I, as principal of CAHS have accepted my calling from God to help the Hispanic population to improve their lives and to get out of poverty." (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 14 at p. 2, Exh. 15 at p. 8.) The classes and the exam are offered in either English or Spanish. (*Id.*, ¶11.10, *Id.* ¶12.3; Roa Dec., ¶2; Acevedo Dec., ¶3.) To foster trust in the program, Defendants often advertise the program through churches and hold classes on church grounds. (Garcia Dec., ¶¶8-10, Exhs. 7-9, ¶11.12 [stating that CAHS classes are offered at church because people are more comfortable attending class at a church than anywhere else]; Porbanic Dec., ¶¶2-3; Acevedo Dec., ¶¶1-2; Roa Dec., ¶¶1-2.)

Defendants make numerous claims about the program, which range from misleading to patently false. Some of these claims are discussed below.

### (a) Defendants falsely claim to offer a high school diploma.

Defendants claim that students who complete their ten-week, thirty-hour course are awarded a high school diploma. (Garcia Dec., ¶9.1, ¶11.1, ¶11.6, Exh. 14 at p. 1, Exh. 15; Porbanic Dec., ¶9; Roa Dec., ¶2; Yepez Dec., ¶3.)

This claim is false or, at the very least, misleading. The requirements for an adult to earn a high school diploma from CAHS are, essentially: (1) payment in full; (2) attendance at ten three-hour classes; (3) passage of a final exam; and (4) participation in the graduation ceremony, wearing the obligatory cap and gown. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at pp. 11-14; Porbanic Dec., ¶¶9-12.) The course and the exam are offered in English or Spanish; Spanish-speaking students do not need to know any English to earn their CAHS diploma. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.10, *Id.* ¶12.3; Roa Dec., ¶2; Acevedo Dec., ¶3.) There are no educational prerequisites. (Garcia Dec., ¶13.10 [stating that consumers can start from "level zero"; there are no entrance requirements].)

This program does not constitute a high school education, and cannot result in a high school diploma that is of any use. As this Court has already suggested, the phrase "high school" indicates a four year course of study. (*Infra* at p. 11.) For students under age 18 to earn a high school diploma in the public school system, they must complete, at a minimum, the following courses, each lasting one year: three courses in English; two courses in mathematics; two courses in science; three courses in social studies; and one course in visual or performing arts or foreign language. Students are also required to take a one-semester course in American government and civics, and a one-semester course in economics. (Ed. Code, § 51225.3, subd. (a).) Instruction must be in English, except for students who are proficient in English and are interested in learning a foreign language. (*Id.* § 30.)

An adult may earn a high school equivalency certificate -- *not* a high school diploma -- only by achieving a score on a State administered exam "equal to the standard of performance expected from high school graduates." (Ed. Code, § 51420.)

The awarding of a high school diploma or its equivalent, then, suggests that the student who has earned it has completed this lengthy and comprehensive educational program or can demonstrate an equivalent mastery of the material as someone who has completed the course work. Defendants' claim to offer a high school diploma is, at a minimum, misleading.

### (b) Defendants falsely claim that the State of California has authorized CAHS to award high school diplomas.

Defendants use many phrases to convey the concept that CAHS has some type of governmental recognition. For example, Defendants claim that "CAHS is legally constituted within the State of California and is so authorized as an educational institution conferring the High School Diploma." (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 14 at p. 1, Exh. 15 at p. 3.) (See also Porbanic Dec., ¶12 [claiming that the CAHS high school diploma"is accepted everywhere you go because it is accepted by the State"].) These statements are false. There is no mechanism by which the State of California "authorizes" private organizations to confer high school diplomas. In fact, any suggestion of such an authorization is expressly prohibited by California law. (*Infra* at p. 18.)

Defendants also claim that CAHS is affiliated with, or has some approval issued by, the Los Angeles Unified School District ("LAUD"). (Porbanic Dec., ¶3, 7, 10; Garcia Dec., ¶9.1, 11.11; Acevedo Dec., ¶2; Yepez Dec., ¶3.) There is no evidence of any such relationship between CAHS and the LAUD.

When asked if CAHS is accredited, Defendants generally admit that it is not. (Garcia Dec., ¶13.11.) They claim, however, that they *choose* not to seek accreditation because it is an expensive process, and that the program would cost \$6,000 to \$7,000 if CAHS were accredited. (*Id.*) This, Defendants claim, would keep out the very students they are trying to help. (*Id.*)

# 

# (c) Defendants falsely claim that students with a CAHS diploma can be admitted to accredited colleges and universities.

Defendants claim that many CAHS students have been admitted to accredited colleges and universities, and that "CAHS" program is widely accepted and recognized by accredited educational institutions." (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at pp. 3, 5, 7-8; Exh. 15 at p. 10 [CAHS's "mission" is to provide an education and high school diploma for students "to gain admission into an accredited college or university"]; Exh. 14 at p. 1, ¶13, Exh. 17 ["we will help you to get into an accredited college or university"]; ¶13, Exh. 17 ["our students have been admitted at regionally and nationally accredited colleges and universities"]; ¶13.1 [claiming that graduates of CAHS have enrolled in accredited colleges and universities; ¶11.11 [claiming that CAHS graduates are eligible to enroll at California State University].)

CAHS graduates, however, do not meet the qualifications for enrollment at accredited colleges and universities such as the California State University ("CSU") and University of California ("UC") systems. For example, CSU and UC applicants must have completed at least the courses than are required to earn a high school diploma through the public school system. (Garcia Dec., ¶¶2-3, Exh. 1.) The admission standards of private colleges and universities in California generally mirror the requirements for graduation from public high school in this state, particularly in course work for English, math and science. (*Id.* ¶3, Exh. 1.)

CAHS graduates can enroll in community college, not because the diploma makes them eligible, but because applicants do not need a high school diploma. (Garcia Dec., ¶4, Exh. 2 at p. 1.) Indeed, students can work toward their high school diploma at a community college. (*Id.* at p. 3.)

# (d) Defendants falsely claim that a CAHS diploma will allow students to get financial aid at accredited colleges and universities.

Defendants claim that CAHS is "the first program of its kind in this nation recognized by the State and Federal Government for students to participate in financial aid at accredited colleges and universities." (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at p. 9.) (See also *id* at p. 3 [claiming that CAHS is "recognized by [the] United States Department of Education for students to

participate in financial aid programs at accredited colleges and universities"]; Exh. 14 at p. 1 [CAHS "is recognized by both the State of California and the Federal Government as an institution conferring the High School Diploma for students to participate in Financial Aid programs at accredited Colleges and Universities"]; *id.* ¶11.3 [claiming CAHS diploma will allow student to get a federal Pell grant].) These statements are false; there is no "recognition" that the State of California, the federal government or their respective Departments of Education bestow on high schools in general, or CAHS in particular, that allows students to get financial aid.

Defendants' false statements that CAHS has such recognition are also misleading in that they create the impression that a CAHS diploma is somehow sufficient to allow students to get financial aid. To the contrary, to be eligible to receive financial aid from the federal government, a student must meet numerous criteria that CAHS "graduates" would not meet. Most notably, students must be accepted for enrollment in an accredited institution (20 U.S.C. § 1091, subd. (a)(1)); for consumers with a CAHS diploma, their *eligibility for admission* to accredited colleges or universities poses a threshold obstacle that would render moot the issue of *financing* their higher education. In addition, to be eligible for state or federal financial aid, a student must be a citizen, national or permanent resident of the United States. (See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091, subd. (a)(5); Ed. Code, § 69433.9, subd. (a); Garcia Dec., ¶5, Exh. 3.)

Defendants make no mention of this critical condition in their materials, although they target non-English-speaking immigrants who may not have such status in this country. (See also, Garcia Dec., ¶11.10 [claiming that CAHS graduates who are in the country illegally would not have a problem enrolling in a university or getting financial aid].)

# (e) Defendants misrepresent the qualifications of CAHS's "principal."

Defendants claim that Daniel Gossai, the person responsible for the CAHS curriculum and teacher training, "holds life time credential [sic] from the State of California to teach at the community college level . . ." (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 14 at p. 1, Exh. 15 at p. 3, ¶13, Exh. 17.) In fact, in 1994 the Victor Valley Community College District terminated Mr. Gossai's

employment as an instructor on the grounds that he engaged in immoral conduct, refused to obey school regulations and rules, committed acts of dishonesty, and was unfit for service. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶2(a), Exh. 1.) Mr. Gossai avoided revocation of his credential only because of a change in the law -- four years earlier, the California community college system discontinued the use of credentials for determining eligibility of instructors. Instead, as part of the Legislature's plan to "professionalize" the community college faculty, the credential system was replaced with a system of minimum qualifications. (Ed. Code, §§ 87350, 87359, subd. (a).) Having been found unfit for service, Mr. Gossai would not meet the minimum qualifications for employment as a community college instructor (as evidenced by his termination.) The result would have been the same under the previous credential-based system; Mr. Gossai's life credential would have been revoked pursuant to former Education Code section 87331, which required revocation for unprofessional or immoral conduct. (Former Ed. Code, § 87331, repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 973, § 27.)

Like the other individual Defendants, Mr. Gossai does not hold either a teaching or administrative credential. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶4.)

In their contacts with consumers, Defendants refer to Mr. Gossai as "Dr." Gossai. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at p. 7, ¶13, Exh. 18; Porbanic Dec., ¶6; Roa Dec., ¶6.) Mr. Gossai claims to hold two doctorate degrees. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶2(d)(iii), Exh. 18.) He claims that one of these degrees, in economics, is from Pacific State University, an unaccredited school in Los Angeles. (*Id.*) That school's dean, however, says that Mr. Gossai was never a student at that university. (Garcia Dec., ¶16.) Mr. Gossai also claims to have earned a doctorate from the University of Aruba in accounting in 1982; Mr. Gossai, however, has lived in California since 1978 (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶2(d)(iii), Exh. 18), which suggests that this doctorate, if he in fact earned it, may be of questionable validity. The People have been unable to determine whether Mr. Gossai attended the University of Aruba.

#### 2. The content of a CAHS "high school education."

The quality of the instruction should not be relevant to the legitimacy of the CAHS high school diploma because it is not possible to complete a high school education in ten weeks,

particularly if there are no academic prerequisites and the course is offered in Spanish to consumers who may not speak English. Nevertheless, to demonstrate the gross inadequacy of the CAHS program, the People set forth a brief description of the course materials and observations from one CAHS class session.

#### (a) The class materials consist of a single, slim workbook.

CAHS does not use any textbooks. Instead, consumers receive a single 54 page workbook printed in both English and Spanish; about 14 pages of the workbook consist of the type of misleading statements described above, as well as the mechanics of finishing the class and getting a diploma. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at pp. 1-14.) The 40 remaining pages of the workbook consist of alternating questions and, in some cases, answers on various topics, including economics, U.S. history and math. The class consists of the teacher reading a question from the workbook and then giving the answer (some of which are written below the question), repeating the process for each question and answer pair. (*Id.* at pp. 15-52; ¶11.8; Yepez Dec., ¶4.)

The CAHS workbook contains numerous factual errors. For example, CAHS students are taught that there are *four* branches of the United States government: the executive, the legislative, the judicial and the administrative. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at p. 26.) CAHS also teaches that the Second World War was from 1938 to 1942. (*Id.* at p. 30.) The workbook also refers to "the book 'Death of A Traveling Salesman." (*Id.* at p. 23.)

#### (b) The teachers do not appear to be competent.

Defendants claim that they employ qualified, well-trained teachers because, in the words of the CAHS workbook, "individuals must be educated before he or she can impart knowledgeable education in the life of anyone" [sic]. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at p. 6.) Defendants claim that:

Our teachers hold accredited degrees that are recognized by the State, Federal Government, and the United States Department of Education. In addition, our teachers possess years of experience in teaching and hold other credentials. Our teachers have undergone training in teaching, development and implementation of our curriculum.

(*Id.* ¶13, Exh. 17; see also *id.*, ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at p. 3, ¶13.2.)

The teachers, however, do not appear to be qualified to clarify or explain the material, and often compound the errors in the CAHS workbook. For example, when asked about the alleged fourth branch of government (the "administrative" branch), one teacher explained that it is not that important and not much is heard about it because it works behind the scenes. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.9.)

In addition, CAHS students have been taught that:

- there are 53 states in the United States; in addition to the "original" 50 states, the Union has added Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. The flag has not yet been updated to reflect the addition of the last three states.
- C the Treasury is part of the "administrative" branch of government, which, as discussed above, is one of the four branches of government.
- C there are two houses of Congress, the Senate and the House; one is for the Democrats, and the other is for the Republicans, respectively.

(Ibid.)

After thirty hours of this type of instruction, Defendants claim to award students a high school diploma.

# 3. Defendants exploit familiar symbols to create the illusion of legitimacy.

Defendants require students to rent a cap and gown, and to attend a commencement ceremony, which is often photographed and videotaped with pride by family members. (Garcia Dec., ¶11.6, Exh. 15 at pp. 11-12;Yepez Dec., ¶5.) The ceremony includes congratulatory and inspirational speeches; usually, "Dr." Gossai, the "principal," makes a speech. (Yepez Dec., ¶5; Roa Dec., ¶7; Acevedo Dec., ¶6.) Because many students speak only Spanish, the speeches are either delivered in Spanish or translated for the students, sometimes by defendant Sandoval. (Roa Dec., ¶7.) Photos of one such graduation are included in Exhibit 8 to the declaration of Edith Garcia. A sample CAHS diploma is attached as Exhibit 4 to the declaration of Jose Yepez.

In the program handed out at one such graduation, "graduates" are encouraged to "take the next step: learning and/or improving your English." (Yepez Dec. ¶5, Exh. 3.)

Defendants also provide transcripts, with grades given in each subject. (Yepez Dec., ¶4, Exh. 2.) On the "unofficial" transcript, students are warned that "transcript is unofficial without signature and embossed dry seal." (*Id.*) CAHS also provides "emergency" transcripts for an additional charge. (Garcia Dec., ¶13.4.)

CAHS graduates are also offered the option of purchasing a class ring. (Porbanic Dec., ¶11.)

# C. This Court recently held that Defendants' conduct violates the law and should be enjoined, yet the CAHS scheme continues unchanged.

In August of 2003, three consumers who had gone through the CAHS program sued in small claims court for a return of their money. According to the consumers, contrary to CAHS representatives' statements, they were unable to enroll in programs requiring a high school diploma. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶2(b)(iii), Exh. 4 [see cross-complainants' declarations accompanying their application for injunction].) Mr. Gossai, who was a defendant in the small claims case, did not defend that action, which resulted in judgment for the plaintiffs. (*Id.*) Rather, he brought a multi-million dollar action in propia persona against the consumers in this Court for, among other things, defamation and interference with CAHS's ability to sell its diplomas to other consumers. (*Id.*, Exh. 2.)

The consumers filed a cross-complaint against Mr. Gossai and CAHS (id., Exh. 3) and successfully moved for entry of a preliminary injunction. (*Id.*, Exhs. 4 and 6.) The Court found that the cross-complainants were likely to prevail on the merits:

In this state, the phrase "high school" indicates a level of schooling given to teenagers that lasts four years and offers a high school diploma. A "high school diploma" or equivalent is often a prerequisite to obtaining employment [or] being admitted to a two-or four-year college or university. A private school may offer a high school curriculum and diploma. A recognized alternative to a high school diploma is a . . . GED.

For a private school to imply that it offers a high school education and diploma when actually it does not is deceptive advertising and an unfair business practice.

(*Id.*, Exh. 6 at p. 3, emphasis added.) The Court further found that Defendants' material, "is clearly deceptive. It implies, incorrectly, that CAHS is an alternative high school whose students

Pursuant to that state's consumer fraud law, the Iowa Attorney General issued a subpoena to CAHS and Mr. Gossai requesting information about the program, but "CAHS and Gossai have failed and refused to produce the documents requested in the subpoena." (*Id.* Exh. 17 at pp. 2-3.) Upon the Attorney General's application, the District Court ordered CAHS and Gossai to comply with the subpoena. (*Id.* Exh. 17 at p. 1;  $\P2(d)(i)$ , Exh. 16.) The Court also enjoined the defendants from operating, pending compliance with the subpoena. (Exh. 17 at p. 2.)

The Nebraska Attorney General has also sued Mr. Gossai and CAHS under that state's unfair competition law, which has so far resulted in the issuance of a temporary restraining order. (Van Gelderen Dec., ¶2(e), Exhs. 19 and 20.)

# F. <u>Daniel Gossai and Janet Gossai have conspired to hide assets from consumer victims and prosecutors.</u>

Mr. Gossai has gone to exceptional lengths in an attempt to make himself judgment proof. Among other things, Mr. Gossai has transferred to Janet Gossai, for nominal or no consideration, much of his real property. Janet Gossai holds those assets as her separate property. Mr. Gossai, however, has maintained control and use of those assets, both to run CAHS and to maintain his affluent lifestyle, which includes an estate in Rancho Palos Verdes and six cars, as identified in the ex parte application.

For example, Mr. Gossai quitclaimed to Mrs. Gossai his interest in his Huntington Park office. (Garcia Dec., ¶17(c), Exh. 22.) He continues to run CAHS from this office. (Garcia Dec., ¶13, Exh. 18, ¶7, Exh. 6; Van Gelderen Dec., ¶3(a), Exh. 21; ¶3(b), Exh. 22.) On the same date that Mr. Gossai quitclaimed his interest in the office property to Mrs. Gossai, she recorded a deed of trust on the property securing a \$145,000 loan. (Garcia Dec., ¶17(d), Exh. 23.)

Mr. Gossai also transferred to Mrs. Gossai his interest in the couple's Rancho Palos Verdes estate. (Garcia Dec., ¶17(b), Exh. 21.) Mrs. Gossai also holds as her separate property several parcels of real estate, which were acquired in 2002. (*Id.*, ¶18(a), Exh. 28; *Id.* ¶17(b), Exh. 29, ¶17(c), Exh. 30.)

The People ask the Court to protect those assets pending resolution of this case, so that the consumer victims can receive restitution, if the Court determines that an order of restitution is appropriate.

### IV. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE

### A. This Court has the authority to issue an injunction under Business and Professions Code sections 17203 and 17535.

Business and Professions Code section 17203 specifically empowers the Court to issue orders "as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition." Similarly, Business and Professions Code section 17535 empowers the Court to issue an injunction "to prevent false or misleading advertising and unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices." (*People v. Columbia Research Corp.* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 607, 610, cert. denied (1977) 434 U.S. 904.)

"An action filed by the People seeking injunctive relief . . . is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public . . ." (*People v. Pacific Land Research Co.* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 10, 17.) Once the trial court invokes its equitable jurisdiction, it is within the court's broad discretion to determine the scope or type of relief that should be granted. (*People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat'l Research Co. of Cal.* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 765, 775, 779.) Such relief may be as "varied and diversified as the means that have been employed by the Defendant to produce the grievance complained of." (*Wickersham v. Crittenden* (1892) 93 Cal. 17, 32; *Roman v. Ries* (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 65, 70.)

# B. The People likely will succeed on the merits at trial and the interim harm the People will suffer if an injunction is not issued is presumed.

Generally, a court determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction applies a two-pronged test. (*IT Corp. v. County of Imperial* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69-70.) First, the court considers the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. (*Id.* at p. 69.) Second, the court balances the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if an injunction is denied with the harm that the defendant may suffer if an injunction is issued. (*Id.* at pp. 69-70.)

In a public action brought pursuant to a law in which the State may obtain injunctive relief, harm to the public is presumed. (*IT Corp.*, *supra*, 35 Cal.3d at p. 70.) In such a case, if the governmental entity establishes a reasonable probability that it will prevail on the merits at trial, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the potential harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to the defendant. (*Id.* at p. 72.) The burden is on the defendants to show that they would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction were issued. (*Ibid.*)

By authorizing injunctive relief to remedy violations of the Unfair Competition Law and the law prohibiting untrue and misleading statements (see Business and Professions Code, sections 17203 and 17535, respectively), the Legislature has already determined that such violations harm the public interest and that an injunction is the proper way to protect against that harm. Thus, if the People demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits at trial, harm to the public is presumed. Instead, Defendant must demonstrate that they will be harmed by issuance of the injunction.

More than a reasonable probability exists that the People will establish violations of Business and Professions Code sections 17500 and 17200. There is overwhelming evidence that Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, Sections 17500 and 17200. Based on this evidence, Defendants could not demonstrate that their interest in continuing to operate their illegal enterprise outweighs the interest of the general public in being protected from such unlawful practices. If Defendants are permitted to continue their unlawful scheme, the harm to the public will be devastating and irreparable. The consumers who fall victim to this scam, who are by definition not well educated and likely to be unfamiliar with the American education system, will continue to waste precious time and money that could have been spend on useful educational programs; both the consumers and the families that depend on them will be irreparably damaged if the injunction is denied.

///

26 || ///

27 ||

28 ||

### 1. The People are reasonably likely to prevail on the merits at trial.

## (a) Defendants have made untrue or misleading statements in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500.

Business and Professions Code section 17500 makes it unlawful for any person to make any statement that such person knows or by the exercise of reasonable care should know to be untrue or misleading in order to sell goods or services. Under Section 17500, a statement is impermissibly untrue or misleading if the statement is likely to mislead members of the public. (*Chern v. Bank of America* (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 876.)

To prove a violation of section 17500, Plaintiff does not have to prove fraud, reliance, or an intent to deceive. (See *People v. Superior Court (Olson)* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 190, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935.) In addition, Plaintiff does not have to show that consumers were actually deceived to establish a statutory violation. (*Id.* at p. 198) Thus, California courts have repeatedly held that a violation occurs at the time that a consumer is solicited, regardless of whether the consumer purchases the goods or services offered. (See, e.g., *People v. Toomey* (1985) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 22-23; *People v. Superior Court (Jayhill)* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 289.)

A failure to disclose may also constitute an untrue or misleading "statement" for purposes of a section 17500 violation. The omission of material information can be as misleading as a direct misstatement of fact. (Ford Dealers Ass'n v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 347, 364; accord Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 609, 618-19, 627.) Moreover, words and sentences that may be literally or technically true may also tend to mislead or deceive the public. (Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sterling Drug, Inc. (2d Cir. 1963) 317 F.2d 669, 674-675) A representation susceptible to both a misleading and a non-misleading interpretation will be construed against the person making it. (Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n (9th Cir. 1975) 518 F.2d 962, 964.)

Defendants have made untrue and misleading statements regarding their ability to provide a high school education, and a high school diploma, in ten weeks. Further, they have made untrue and misleading claims about consumers' ability to use the diploma to pursue higher education, to receive financial aid, and to get a better job. Therefore, Defendants have violated, and continue to

violate, section 17500 of the Business and Professions Code. Because Defendants' illegal conduct is overt and ongoing, the People are more than reasonably likely to prevail on the merits at trial.

### (b) Defendants have engaged in unfair business practices in violation of Section 17200.

Unfair competition includes "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." (Bus. and Prof. Code, § 17200.) In drafting the Unfair Competition Law, the Legislature intentionally used "sweeping language," and empowered the court to issue injunctions to curb any such business practice "in whatever context such activity might occur." (*Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn.* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 111.) In addition, the statute is written in the disjunctive, thereby establishing "three varieties of unfair competition -- acts or practices which are unlawful *or* unfair *or* fraudulent. In other words, a practice is prohibited as 'unfair' or 'deceptive' even if not 'unlawful' or vice versa." (*Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp.* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647.)

### i. Defendants have committed unlawful acts and practices.

Section 17200 "borrows" violations of other laws and makes them actionable as unlawful business practices. (*State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103.) An unlawful business act or practice, then, includes any activity that is forbidden by law, "be it civil or criminal, federal, state or municipal, statutory or regulatory, or court-made [law]." (*Saunders v. Super. Ct.* (1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 838-839.)

#### a. Defendants have violated Section 17500.

Untrue or misleading statements in violation of Section 17500 also constitute unfair competition as defined in section 17200. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; *Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 210.) Therefore, all of Defendants' violations of Section 17500 also constitute violations of Section 17200.

### b. Defendants have violated California Education Code Section 33190.

The California Department of Education maintains a list of private schools with an enrollment of six or more students. The Department's information is based solely on each school's submission of an affidavit, pursuant to Education Code section 33190. Though they are not legally required to do so (*infr*a at p. 18), Defendants have filed private school affidavits pursuant to this section. (Garcia Dec., ¶7, Exhs. 5 and 6.)

The Department of Education does not approve, recognize or endorse any school that files such an affidavit; accordingly, Section 33190 expressly provides that no such claim shall be made:

Filing pursuant to this section shall not be interpreted to mean, and it shall be unlawful for any school to expressly or impliedly represent by any means whatsoever, that the State of California, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of Education, the State Department of Education, or any division or bureau of the department, or any accrediting agency has made any evaluation, recognition, approval, or endorsement of the school or course unless this is an actual fact.

(Ed. Code, § 33190, subd. (g).)

Defendants' scheme depends heavily on frequent and prominent violations of this section. In the CAHS orientation, Defendants show the identification number that is assigned upon filing an affidavit, and state that this makes the school a functioning entity in the state and gives the school permission to operate. (Porbanic Dec., ¶7.) Defendants claim that CAHS is "recognized" by the State, and that it is "legally constituted within the State of California and is so authorized as an educational institution conferring the High School Diploma." (*Supra* at p. 5.) Each time these statements are repeated, Defendants violate Section 33190.

Indeed, their decision to file an affidavit at all appears to be motivated by an intent to misrepresent the affidavit's significance. Part-time schools for adults are not required to file an affidavit. That obligation applies only to private full-time day schools for children aged 6 to 18, who are subject to compulsory full-time education laws. (Garcia Dec., ¶7, Exhs. 5 and 6 ["[t]he Private School Affidavit is for [persons] offering or conducting a **full-time day** school at the elementary or high school level for students between the ages of **6 and 18 years**]; Ed. Code, §§ 48200, 48415 [minors are exempt from compulsory public instruction if they attend a private

schools that has filed an affidavit pursuant to Section 33190].) It seems, then, that Defendants' main -- and likely exclusive -- reason for filing an affidavit is to mislead consumers into believing that the State stands behind the CAHS program.

### ii. Defendants have engaged in fraudulent business acts and practices.

A "fraudulent" business act or practice under section 17200 bears little resemblance to common law fraud and "only requires a showing [that] members of the public 'are likely to be deceived.'" (*Saunders*, *supra*, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.) Proof of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage are unnecessary. (See, e.g., *Committee on Children's Television*, *supra*, 35 Cal.3d at p. 211.)

Defendants' conduct is "fraudulent" within the meaning of Section 17200 in that members of the public are likely to be deceived about the significance and utility of a CAHS education and diploma.

## iii. Defendants have engaged in unfair business acts and practices.

Section 17200 also denounces "unfair" business practices in a broad manner. As the Supreme Court has noted:

In permitting the restraining of all "unfair" business practices, section 3369 [the predecessor to section 17200] undeniably establishes only a wide standard to guide courts of equity; . . . given the creative nature of the scheming mind, the Legislature evidently concluded that a less inclusive standard would not be adequate.

(*Barquis, supra*, 7 Cal.3d at p. 112.) "Unfairness" under Section 17200 has been equated to violations of the "fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing . . . ." (*Ibid.*) "Unfairness" may also be determined by weighing the "impact [of the practice or act] on its alleged victim . . . against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer." (*Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins.* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1498 (citation omitted, alternations in original).

Defendants' conduct is unfair according to any of these definitions. The CAHS scheme violates "fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing" by creating the illusion that CAHS is a respected pioneer in the field of "alternative education" that is endorsed by the State, that those who run it have the credentials and experience to provide a quality education, and that those who

complete the program will have the rights and privileges given to graduates of traditional high schools. Moreover, the impact on Defendants' victims -- in time, money and foregone opportunities -- outweighs any justification that Defendants could offer for engaging in the conduct.

The conduct of Defendants Daniel Gossai and Janet Gossai in manipulating title to assets acquired with the proceeds of this scheme is also unfair within the meaning of Section 17200. Mr. Gossai, who wrongfully acquires money and property via the CAHS scheme, transfers title to Mrs. Gossai, who acts as a repository for the wrongfully-acquired assets. Mr. Gossai continues to make use of these assets -- including, but not limited to, CAHS's Huntington Park office -- to further the CAHS scheme and to finance the couple's lifestyle while attempting to appear financially unaccountable to consumers victims and prosecutors. From the perspective of the Gossais, then, this financial shell-game is an important part of the CAHS scheme for at least two reasons: it emboldens these defendants to continue the scheme because they believe they are judgment-proof, and it presents at least the perception of an additional hurdle to those seeking compensation for harm caused by the CAHS scheme. Thus, this conduct violates Section 17200.

2. California consumers will be irreparably harmed from denial of an injunction; Defendants will not suffer irreparable injury from its issuance.

As discussed above, in this case, there is a rebuttable presumption that the potential harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to Defendants. (*Supra* at p. 15.) Defendants cannot rebut that presumption.

Defendants' ongoing violations of the law pose a continuing threat to consumers.

Consumers waste both time and money pursuing useless diplomas from CAHS. While the money could be repaid, the lost time cannot. Consumers who face demands of work and family may have lost forever the opportunity to earn a legitimate high school diploma or to study for the GED. In addition, consumers' embarrassment in front of once-proud relatives, and their humiliation when their "diploma" is refused by a potential employer or school cannot be measured or repaid.

Meanwhile, Defendants profit by flouting their legal obligations. Defendants cannot plausibly argue that their interest in continuing to operate in defiance of this Court's permanent

injunction and in violation of explicit statutory requirements outweighs the interest of the general public in being protected from such unlawful business practices. Even if Defendants could credibly argue that they would be harmed by issuance of an injunction, such as by losing "tuition" or revenue from cap and gown rentals, that "harm" could be compensated monetarily.

In addition, even if Defendants could offer evidence demonstrating that they would suffer grave or irreparable harm from a preliminary injunction, and assuming that Defendants could prevail in the balancing of the harms, the Court may nonetheless issue a preliminary injunction. As long as "it appears fairly clear that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, a trial court might legitimately decide that an injunction should issue even though the plaintiff is unable to prevail in a balancing of the probable harms." (*IT Corp.*, *supra*, 35 Cal.3d at pp.72-73.)

It is, at the very least, "fairly clear" that the People will prevail on the merits at trial.

Despite any alleged harm Defendants might suffer, a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction should issue to stop their illegal practices.

### V. THE PEOPLE REQUEST THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER

Defendants have committed numerous violations of California's consumer protection laws to extract money from this state's consumers. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 17203 and 17535, this Court is expressly empowered to appoint a receiver to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice that violates Sections 17200 and 17500 et seq. or to restore the money or property that was acquired by means of such violations.

Additionally, the Government Code recognizes the power of the Court to prevent the dissipation of money or property that was collected through unlawful business practices and thus will be returned as restitution to victims in cases such as this. Government Code section 12527 specifically authorizes the Court to appoint a receiver in cases brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the People if: (1) "[t]he Attorney General has a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits at trial in establishing that the defendant obtained real or personal property by any unlawful means"; and (2) "[t]he appointment of a receiver would facilitate the maintenance, preservation, operation, or recovery of that property for any restitutionary purpose." (Gov. Code, § 12527, subd. (b).) The People have met those conditions here.

### A. The People have a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits at trial.

As set forth in detail above and in the accompanying declarations and exhibits, the People are likely to prevail on their causes of action against Defendants. At this stage of the litigation, the People have not yet determined how much money consumers have lost, but there is ample evidence that Defendants have become wealthy via this scheme. For example, Mr. and Mrs. Gossai -- whose main, if not sole, source of income seems to be the CAHS scheme -- own over \$1.5 million in real estate and six cars.

Therefore, there is a reasonable probability that the People will prove at trial that Defendants "obtained real or personal property by . . . unlawful means." (Gov. Code, § 12527, subd. (b)(1).)

B. Appointment of a receiver will prevent Defendants from continuing to engage in unlawful practices, and will facilitate the preservation and recovery of that property to pay restitution to consumer victims.

The appointment of a receiver will serve two independent, yet equally important, purposes. First, it will prevent Defendants from continuing to collect money from consumers in violation of Sections 17200 and 17500, and second, it will preserve Defendants' assets, which may be used to pay restitution to Defendants' victims.

The People submit that Defendants will continue their unlawful practices unless a receiver is appointed to supervise their business operations. Defendants Daniel Gossai and California Alternative High School have been subject to injunctions since December 2003, which prohibited most of the misconduct discussed above. (*Supra* at pp. 11-12.) They have disobeyed those orders, and instead continue to collect money from consumers unlawfully. In addition, the City of Huntington Park denied CAHS permission to operate in that City because, among other things, Mr. Gossai refused to provide the required information for issuance of a business license. (*Supra* at p. 12.) Mr. Gossai and CAHS, however, continue to conduct business from their office in Huntington Park. (*Ibid.*) Also, Mr. Gossai and CAHS refused to comply with the Iowa Attorney General's investigation of CAHS, forcing the Attorney General to seek assistance from the District Court. (*Supra* at pp. 12-13.)

26

27

28

Given Defendants' disregard for the law, it is necessary to place Defendants' business under the control of a receiver to ensure compliance with the law and to prevent further victimization of consumers. Among other things, as the People discovered during their investigation, Defendants receive a steady stream of consumer phone calls at their office in Huntington Park. (Garcia Dec., ¶13.3, 13.4). Also, the instructors tell consumers to communicate directly with Defendants, rather than with the instructors and directors where the classes are offered. (Porbanic Dec., ¶7.) It can reasonably be expected that this litigation will prompt even more consumer questions, many of which will be addressed to Defendants directly. Therefore, the People submit that a receiver should be in place to respond to these inquiries, many of which will concern the legality of CAHS, the status of the litigation and, as always, dissatisfaction with the CAHS program. In addition, there is a need for communication with the vast network of sites at which classes are offered. There is no evidence that Defendants have communicated the changes compelled by the earlier preliminary and permanent injunction to the individuals who run the CAHS program at these sites. A receiver will be a reliable conduit of information to those individuals, who are in direct contact with consumers at every phase from recruitment to "graduation." In addition, the receiver will safeguard the books and records of the defendant corporations, which will be necessary to locate the corporations' assets and to identify consumers who may be entitled to restitution.

A receiver is also necessary for the maintenance, preservation, operation, and/or recovery of Defendants' wrongfully-acquired property, so that it may be used to make restitution to consumers. Among other things, at the direction of the Court, the receiver may: (1) take possession of real and personal property obtained by unlawful means, and the proceeds of that property; the receiver may also take possession of property with which the unlawfully-obtained property and its proceeds have been commingled; (2) avoid transfers to those who participated in the wrongful acts, transfers to those who knew that the property was wrongfully obtained and, for the year prior to entry of the receivership order, transfers to those who did not give reasonably equivalent value for that property; and (3) take possession of the books and records relating to the unlawfully-obtained property and the proceeds of that property. (Gov. Code, § 12527, subd. (c).)

At this early stage, the People have not yet discovered the full extent to which Defendants have profited from the CAHS scheme. The People have, however, located certain bank accounts funded by Defendants' misconduct, and real estate and personal property that has been acquired, at least in part, with the proceeds of the CAHS scheme. Placing these assets in the possession of the receiver will better ensure that those assets are available for restitution, in the event that the Court orders restitution, while ensuring the payment of ordinary business expenses during the pendency of this action. In addition, placing a receiver in the position to manage the Defendant corporations will enable the receiver to collect and safeguard payments from consumer victims to CAHS, thereby securing those monies for potential return to the victims.

Separately, the People have requested an order freezing certain of Defendants' assets This order will safeguard the assets of which the receiver will not take possession. These assets include, but are not limited to, the real estate of Daniel Gossai and Janet Gossai that has been nominally transferred between them to thwart creditors, and which will likely be drained of equity or sold if the Court does not intervene. The freeze order will also protect the assets that have not yet been transferred to the receiver, including, but not limited to, assets that the receiver and/or the People have not yet located.

# C. The People have made the showing required by CRC 1900 for ex parte appointment of a receiver.

The People submit that appointment of a receiver cannot wait until after hearing on a noticed motion for at least two, independent reasons. First, this Court has already determined that Defendants' conduct causes irreparable injury to consumers. (*Supra* at p. 12.) Based on Defendants' past actions, it is likely that they will continue to violate the law until they are removed from a position that allows them to do so. Immediate appointment of a receiver will greatly diminish Defendants' ability to continue to mislead consumers through their high school scheme.

Second, it is likely that defendants will attempt to dissipate their assets once they have learned of this action. While this cannot be known with certainty until it is too late (i.e., once they have already done so), there are many indications that this will result. As discussed above,

1	Defendants have not obeyed the law when ord	lered to do so. Also, defendants Daniel Gossai and			
2	Janet Gossai have placed much of their real estate in her name alone. Although the People intend				
3	to prove that this strategy is ineffective, it is nevertheless evidence of their willingness to hide				
4	assets from consumer victims and prosecutors. The appointment of a receiver and an asset freeze				
5	order will safeguard those assets while continuing to operate the business in a lawful manner. In				
6	the event that the People do not prevail at trial, control over those assets can be returned to				
7	Defendants. In contrast, if a receiver is not appointed and the assets are dissipated, consumer				
8	victims will be deprived of restitution without recourse.				
9	VI. CONCLUSION				
10	For the foregoing reasons, the People respectfully request that the Court grant the				
11	requested relief.				
12					
13	Dated: August 2, 2004	Respectfully submitted,			
14		BILL LOCKYER Attorney General			
15	$\parallel$	ALBERT NORMAN SHELDEN Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General			
16	N	MICHELE R. VAN GELDEREN Deputy Attorney General			
17					
18	By: Ā	MICHELE R. VAN GELDEREN			
19	I	Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Plaintiff, the People			
20	C	of the State of California			
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					