

## STATE AND LOCAL POLICIES

### I. INTRODUCTION

This year, the Board examines its continuing mission to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling through a past, present, and future lens. Beginning with the past, Section II assesses whether the adoption of RIPA recommendations by the eight largest law enforcement agencies in California that first began reporting their RIPA data beginning on July 1, 2018 (the “Wave 1” agencies) resulted in any changes to the data they report under RIPA. In particular, the Board looks at these Wave 1 agencies to determine whether there were any changes in racial and identity group disparities in the agencies’ stop data, looking at key metrics, such as stops, requests for searches, searches, or length of detention. *[Note: The scope of this analysis is still under development.]*

Turning to the present, the Board analyzes the impact of recent immigration enforcement actions by federal agents on state and local policing. Section III provides a brief overview of *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, where Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh opined that an immigration officer can consider an individual’s apparent ethnicity, among other things, to determine whether to stop the individual and ask about their immigration status — the so-called “Kavanaugh stop.” This section also discusses how RIPA prohibits state and local law enforcement officers from racial and identity profiling using Kavanaugh stops and examines other state laws like the California Values Act. In Section IV, the Board builds off last year’s analysis of stops of individuals with perceived limited English fluency by looking at perceived lack of English fluency, perceived race/ethnicity, and actions taken in the stop, to determine whether there are perceived racial or identity groups are treated disproportionately, and whether they are adversely affected by their perceived lack of English fluency. *[Note: Consistent with Board comments, this analysis is subject to DOJ capacity.]*

Concluding with the future, Section V expands upon the Board’s analysis of law enforcement’s use of emergent technologies in the 2026 RIPA Report, and how the use of certain technologies by law enforcement, as well as the use of other technologies for studying law enforcement, might contribute to — or help to reduce — racial and identity profiling and disparities. Finally, Section VI provides recommendations based on research and data relating to policies that, if adopted, could reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling or disparities going forward.

### II. LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL AND IDENTITY GROUP DISPARITIES FOLLOWING REFORMS

*[Content in development]*

*DOJ is assessing the viability of a longitudinal review of Wave 1 agencies’ disparities in perceived racial and identity characteristics by looking at particular RIPA data elements (e.g., stops, consent search requests, use of force, or stop outcomes). We will examine whether any Wave 1 agency implemented any change(s) in policy, practice, training, deployment, etc. since they began submitting RIPA data and analyze whether those changes are associated with a reduction in disparities. Through this exercise, the Board might be able to identify actions agencies have taken that appear to have worked to reduce racial disparities, including actions the Board may have recommended in past reports. For example, we will look again at the Los Angeles Police Department (which enacted policies limiting pretextual vehicle stops and vehicle stops for minor/non-safety violations) and the San Francisco Police Department (which enacted a policy limiting vehicle stops for minor/non-safety violations).*

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### III. PRESENT DAY: “KAVANAUGH STOPS” AND HOW CALIFORNIA LAW PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS FROM RACIAL AND IDENTITY PROFILING

Federal immigration enforcement operations have moved beyond targeting individuals identified by immigration enforcement agencies as significant public safety risks.<sup>1</sup> At the time of this writing, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a federal immigration agent’s perception that an individual is either undocumented or a foreign national could subject them to immigration enforcement regardless of whether they have any criminal history. Enforcement operations also now involve multiple federal agencies and agents who operate in plainclothes, wear face coverings, or who have limited identifying information as an immigration agent.<sup>2</sup> This targeting of immigrant communities has resulted in increased frequency of broad-based arrests<sup>3</sup> and increased racial and identity profiling.

This shift in immigration enforcement practices has not only impacted individuals but led to the emergence of legal precedent that complicates California’s ability to prevent racial and identity profiling by state and local law enforcement. Increased federal immigration operations raise concerns in California, where foreign-born residents make up 28% of the population and represent 22% of the nation’s immigrant foreign-born population,<sup>4</sup> making California home the largest immigrant communities in the country. State laws provide vital safeguards that prohibit state and local law enforcement officers from engaging in racial and identity profiling<sup>5</sup> and help ensure that Californians are not targeted based on perceived ethnicity, race, or national origin.

#### A. *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo and the Emergence of “Kavanaugh stops”*

Public reports indicate that federal immigration enforcement agents are currently relying on a combination of factors that inevitably extend immigration enforcement stops to anyone whose appearance, language, employment, or presence matches a subjective profile.<sup>6</sup> These factors include a person’s presence at particular work sites such as day laborer pickup sites or

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<sup>1</sup> “[T]he Trump administration has, among other actions: declared an emergency at the southern U.S. border, enabling military action there; expanded expedited removals, which allow immigration officials to deport undocumented immigrants without a court hearing; initiated a mass deportation campaign involving hundreds of removal flights; broadened the authority of several agencies to enforce immigration laws; directed the creation of Homeland Security Task Forces in all fifty states to combat cross-border crime; and allocated tens of billions of dollars in additional funding to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other agencies for detention and deportation operations.” Houser, *I worked for ICE and CBP. Our current system makes everyone less safe*, USA Today (Jan. 13, 2026), <<https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2026/01/13/ice-minnesota-immigration-enforcement-political-signaling/88146795007/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Haddock & Roy, *ICE and Deportations: How Trump Is Reshaping Immigration Enforcement*, Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 27, 2026), <<https://www.cfr.org/articles/ice-and-deportations-how-trump-reshaping-immigration-enforcement>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>2</sup> Fadel et al., *Masked immigration agents are spurring fear and confusion across the U.S.*, National Public Radio (July 10, 2025), <<https://www.npr.org/2025/07/09/nx-s1-5440311/ice-raids-masked-agents>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>3</sup> Blair & Hausman, *Immigration Enforcement in the First Nine Months of the Second Trump Administration*, Deportation Date Project (Jan. 27, 2026), <<https://deportationdata.org/analysis/immigration-enforcement-first-nine-months-trump.html>> [as of XX, 2026]; Craft & Singh, *US arrests more immigrants in February 2025 than any month in last seven years*, The Guardian (Mar. 13, 2025), <<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/13/us-immigration-arrests-february-2025>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>4</sup> Cuellar Mejia & Johnson, *Immigrants in California*, Public Policy Institute of California (Jan. 2026), <<https://ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california>> [as of XX, 2025].

<sup>5</sup> Penal Code, § 13519.4, subd. (f).

<sup>6</sup> Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days*. (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

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agricultural sites, the type of work they do, speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent, and their apparent race or ethnicity. Agents can use these factors to determine whether they have reasonable suspicion to ask about an individual’s immigration status.<sup>7</sup>

These factors came under consideration by the Supreme Court after three people were detained by federal immigration agents in California. On June 18, 2025, while waiting at a bus stop to be picked up for a construction job, four unmarked cars with tinted windows and no license plates abruptly surrounded Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and Isaac Antonio Villegas Molina, residents of Pasadena, California, who worked as day laborers.<sup>8</sup> Masked men with guns, including military-style weapons, appeared and ran toward them aggressively.<sup>9</sup> The masked men wore regular clothes with no visible badges and did not identify themselves.<sup>10</sup> Mr. Vasquez Perdomo tried to move away but was immediately surrounded, grabbed, handcuffed, and forced into a car.<sup>11</sup> The masked men were immigration enforcement agents, but they never showed warrants, never identified themselves, or informed the Plaintiffs of the basis for their arrests.<sup>12</sup> The Plaintiffs were afraid and believed they were being kidnapped.<sup>13</sup>

Mr. Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto, and Villegas Molina subsequently brought a constitutional challenge against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and DHS Secretary Kristi Noem, alleging that their warrantless arrests violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless stops without reasonable suspicion.<sup>14</sup> While the lower courts initially sided with Mr. Vasquez Perdomo and the other plaintiffs with respect to a request for a temporary restraining order, on September 8, 2025, the Supreme Court granted Defendant Noem’s application to stay enforcement of the temporary restraining order, which for many “signaled [] support for ICE’s continued use of racial profiling in immigration policing.”<sup>15</sup>

The term ‘Kavanaugh stop’ emerged from Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion and refers to an immigration enforcement stop justified by the factors discussed in *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*. Specifically, Justice Kavanaugh opined that, while “apparent ethnicity *alone* cannot furnish reasonable suspicion . . . it can be a ‘relevant factor’ when considered along with other salient factors” that, together, create reasonable suspicion someone is “illegally present” in the United States.<sup>16</sup> Addressing the concern U.S. citizens would also be stopped and questioned based on their apparent ethnicity, Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that any such stops would be “brief,” and that when immigration agents “learn that the individual they stopped is a U.S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, they promptly let the individual go.”<sup>17</sup>

As noted by some researchers, however, this assertion is not consistent with the experience of many U.S. citizens when being stopped by federal immigration agents.<sup>18</sup> Americans have

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<sup>7</sup> *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 146 U.S. 1, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

<sup>9</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

<sup>10</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

<sup>11</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

<sup>12</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

<sup>13</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656, 668.

<sup>14</sup> *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 148 F.4th 656.

<sup>15</sup> Chacón, *Whose Common Sense? Some Reflection on Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, Border Criminologies, University of Oxford Faculty Law Blogs, Sept. 24, 2025 <<https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/border-criminologies-blog/blog-post/2025/09/whose-common-sense-some-reflections-noem-v-vazquez>> [as of XX, 2026]

<sup>16</sup> *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 606 U.S. \_\_\_, 5-6, emphasis added.

<sup>17</sup> *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* (2025) 606 U.S. \_\_\_, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

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reportedly been dragged,<sup>19</sup> tackled,<sup>20</sup> beaten,<sup>21</sup> tased,<sup>22</sup> and shot<sup>23</sup> by immigration enforcement agents. Some citizens have also reported having their necks kneeled on,<sup>24</sup> being held outside in the rain while in their underwear,<sup>25</sup> and being “roughed up” and “shoved” while pregnant.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Wilmer, *US Citizen and Army Veteran Submits Claims for Unconstitutional Immigration Detention* (Aug. 18, 2025) Institute for Justice <<https://ij.org/press-release/us-citizen-and-army-veteran-submits-claims-for-unconstitutional-immigration-detention/>> [as of XX, 2026] (Federal immigration agents encountered U.S. citizen and veteran George Retes after he drove through an ICE roadblock where a protest had formed; Retes was pepper sprayed, his car window was broken, and he was subject to tear gas because of the protest. Agents dragged George out of his car, put a knee on Retes’s back and neck, and broke his car window. Agents detained Retes for three days in an isolation cell without being provided access to an attorney or phone call; during that time, Retes was not presented to a judge and missed his daughter’s third birthday. He was never charged with a crime); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>20</sup> Louallen, *79-year-old US citizen claims ICE agents body-slammed him at his business, seeks \$50M* (Sept. 26, 2025) ABC News <<https://abcnews.com/US/79-year-us-citizen-claims-ice-agents-body/story?id=125978834>> [as of XX, 2026] (Rafie Ollah Shouhed, 79 years old and a U.S. citizen, claims to have “suffered multiple broken ribs, elbow injuries and a traumatic brain injury during the Sept. 9 incident” and “alleges that masked Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Border Patrol agents showed up at [his] car wash. Surveillance video shows an agent appearing to detain another man in the parking lot. When the elderly businessman approached, another agent begins struggling with him before another agent takes him to the ground.” He claims that when he “attempted to show agents proof of his employees’ work authorization, agents “cursed at him” and “violently body-slammed him onto the pavement.” Three agents then allegedly pinned him down, with one placing a knee on his neck . . .” He claims to have told agents, “If there is anything I can do for you, let me help you. I have papers for these guys.”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days*. (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>21</sup> Lehr, *Oxnard Man Released After Being Detained by ICE Agents While Filming Father’s Arrest* (June 19, 2025) KEYT News Channel 3-12 <<https://tinyurl.com/yajvfjdd>> [as of XX, 2026] (“My husband is a U.S. citizen, he never should have been taken,” said Monique Ramirez. The family’s attorney said Diaz was “attacked by these ICE agents, maced, punched, beaten,” and then transported to a local hospital before being moved to the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angeles”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>22</sup> Terry, *U.S. citizen tased and detained during ICE operation in Des Plaines, Illinois* (Sept. 16, 2026) CBS News <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6p4mmc>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Edgar said that when the [ICE] agent originally came to the passenger door, he tried holding the door closed, preventing him from opening it. He said at that time he and his family had no idea who was at the vehicle, and everyone was scared. When the agent tried opening the door, Edgar said he was tased in the face. That’s when he told everyone in the truck to run for their lives. Despite being a U.S. citizen, he said they ran out of fear”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>23</sup> Uranga, *U.S. citizen shot from behind as he warned ICE agents about children gathering at bus stop, lawyers say* (Nov. 2, 2025) Los Angeles Times <<https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-11-02/lawyers-say-ice-shot-us-citizen-from-behind-as-he-stopped-to-warn-them-of-children>> [as of XX, 2026] (U.S. citizen Carlos Jimenez reported being shot by ICE agents in Ontario, California after warning them about children gathering at a nearby school bus stop. “He was telling them, ‘Excuse me. Can you guys please, you know, please wrap this up.’ And immediately, the masked agent pulls out a gun and exchanges some words,” said lawyer Cynthia Santiago. “[The agent is] also shaking his pepper spray.” “He’s in fear, and he’s trying to get out of the situation,” she said. The agents and their cars had blocked one southern lane on Vineyard Avenue and juttled into a second. “He had to reverse to get away,” said Simon. “Then there was a shot from the side, back passenger window, to the car,” Santiago said. “Use of deadly force is to be used as a last resort. Coming out to communities with guns drawn is the opposite”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and*

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ProPublica reviewed accounts of immigration enforcement agents detaining U.S. citizens and “found more than 170 such incidents during the first nine months of President Donald Trump’s second administration.”<sup>27</sup> Among the citizens detained were nearly 20 children, including two children with cancer.<sup>28</sup> Four of the children were held for weeks with their undocumented mother and without access to an attorney until a congresswoman intervened.<sup>29</sup> Two dozen Americans reported being held for more than a day without being able to contact attorneys or next of kin. ProPublica also found that agents had arrested about 130 American citizens, including a dozen

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*Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://www.propublica.org/article/immigration-dhs-american-citizens-arrested-detained-against-will>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>24</sup> Democracy Now!, “*They Kidnapped Me*”: L.A. Immigrant Rights Activist Recounts Violent Arrest by Masked Federal Agents (Aug. 19, 2025) <[https://www.democracynow.org/2025/8/19/union\\_del\\_barrio](https://www.democracynow.org/2025/8/19/union_del_barrio)> [as of XX, 2026] (Footage of the arrest of Amanda Trebach, a U.S. citizen, “shows two plainclothes, masked agents pinning her against the pavement as they kneel on her back and head to handcuff her. One of the agents, yes, seen putting his knee on Trebach’s head for a brief moment as a person recording yells, “Get off her head!”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>25</sup> Acevedo, *U.S.-citizen family “traumatized” after ICE raided their Oklahoma home in search of someone else* (Apr. 30, 2025) NBC News <<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/us-citizen-family-traumatized-ice-raid-rcna203700>> [as of XX, 2026] (A family of U.S. citizens reported that about 20 armed agents “busted through the door in the middle of the night. . . At first, the mother didn’t know who they were. “It was dark. All the lights were off,” she said. “My initial thought was we were being robbed — that my daughters, being females, were being kidnapped. . . .” She said the agents ordered her and her daughters to step outside, even though it was raining and they barely were given time to put on clothes. “They wanted me to change in front of all of them, in between all of them,” she said. “My husband has not even seen my daughter in her undergarments — her own dad, because it’s respectful. You have her out there, a minor, in her underwear,” the woman told KFOR”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>26</sup> Medina & Soto, *Pregnant US citizen speaks out after being detained by ICE agents searching for her husband* (Aug. 8, 2025) MSN <<https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/pregnant-us-citizen-speaks-out-after-being-detained-by-ice-agents-searching-for-her-husband/ar-AA1K7LvM?cvid=29C548A67093400BB35419B53F382CBF&ocid=se>> [as of XX, 2026] (Video on social media shows the arrests of Sabrina Medina, a U.S. citizen, outside her health clinic. “Medina says agents roughed her up and pushed her belly against the car. After complaining of abdominal pain, she was taken to a the hospital”); Acevedo, *A pregnant U.S. citizen went to the hospital after immigration agents detained her* (June 10, 2025) NBC News <<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/pregnant-us-citizen-went-hospital-immigration-agents-detained-rcna212033>> [as of XX, 2026] (Cary López Alvarado, a U.S. citizen, reported that she lost her balance as masked agents wearing Border Patrol uniforms “shoved her” during her arrest. “That’s when I kind of leaned forward, trying to protect the stomach.” . . . “I crouched down and held my belly, because I was scared they would hurt me. . . . Three agents were grabbing me and trying to handcuff me.” López Alvarado said she started experiencing sharp pains in her stomach after she was arrested and released Sunday and that she went to the hospital”); Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days*. (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>27</sup> Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>28</sup> Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>29</sup> Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

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elected officials, for allegedly interfering with or assaulting officers, yet those cases were often dropped and not prosecuted.<sup>30</sup>

While many of the individuals being targeted in response to large-scale immigration sweeps are Latino,<sup>31</sup> other demographics are being impacted, including Native Americans.<sup>32</sup> For example, there have been reports of immigration enforcement officers not accepting Tribal citizenship documentation as proof of citizenship during immigration enforcement operations despite longstanding law affirming that all Native Americans born within the territorial limited of the United States are U.S. citizens<sup>33</sup> and that tribal identification cards are an acceptable form of federal identification, including at land and sea borders.<sup>34</sup>

Race- and identity-based immigration enforcement creates a climate of fear and anxiety for entire communities. In cities with a “substantial Native population that includes individuals of mixed Native and Latino or Hispanic heritage, the result [is] the profiling of Tribal citizens whose physical appearances [are] treated as a proxy for immigration status.”<sup>35</sup> Navajo Nation President Buu Nygren shared that members of the Navajo Nation have had traumatizing experiences with ICE agents.<sup>36</sup>

A telling case is Jose Roberto Ramirez, a 20-year-old citizen of the Red Lake Nation who was detained by ICE agents in January.<sup>37</sup> Videos of the scene of his detention show ICE agents “drawing guns, dragging Ramirez from his car, and handcuffing him. Although his aunt showed his birth certificate and U.S. passport, agents refused to release him; one even told Ramirez ‘he wasn’t from here.’ ICE detained Ramirez for several hours before letting him go without

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<sup>30</sup> If U.S. citizens interfere with or assault federal immigration enforcement agents while they are performing their duties, the agents are authorized to detain and arrest those individuals for their alleged behavior. Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>31</sup> Foy, *We Found That More Than 170 U.S. Citizens Have Been Held by Immigration Agents. They’ve Been Kicked, Dragged and Detained for Days* (Oct. 16, 2025) ProPublica <<https://tinyurl.com/4paf32wu>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>32</sup> Hay, *Native Americans Say Tribal Members Harassed by Immigration Agents* (Jan. 30, 2025) Reuters <<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/native-americans-say-tribal-members-harassed-by-immigration-agents-2025-01-30/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>33</sup> Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253.

<sup>34</sup> Kunesh, *Native Americans are getting swept up in immigration raids. Homeland Security Secretary Mullin has an opportunity to fix it* (Apr. 17, 2025) Brookings <<https://tinyurl.com/ydcus8us>> [as of XX, 2026]. Several Tribes issue Enhanced Tribal Cards (ETCs) that are legal identification documents recognized under 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(e) (2024). See also Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: Designation of an Approved Native American Tribal Card Issued by the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas as an Acceptable Document To Denote Identity and Citizenship for Entry in the United States at Land and Sea Ports of Entry, 87 Fed. Reg. 37,879 (June 24, 2022) (representative designation notice under § 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638). Some Tribes, such as the Tlingit and Haida Tribe, also issue enhanced Tribal cards with security features that meet the requirements of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

<sup>35</sup> Kunesh, *Native Americans are getting swept up in immigration raids. Homeland Security Secretary Mullin has an opportunity to fix it* (Apr. 17, 2025) Brookings <<https://tinyurl.com/ydcus8us>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>36</sup> Hay, *Native Americans Say Tribal Members Harassed by Immigration Agents* (Jan. 30, 2025) Reuters <<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/native-americans-say-tribal-members-harassed-by-immigration-agents-2025-01-30/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>37</sup> Schafer, ‘I felt like I was kidnapped’: Ojibwe man recounts ICE detention (Jan. 9, 2026) ICT News <<https://ictnews.org/news/i-felt-like-i-was-kidnapped-ojibwe-man-recounts-ice-detainment/>> [as of XX, 2026]

(“Ramirez said multiple times he tried informing the agents he was a US citizen and a descendant of a federally recognized tribe . . .” “I felt like I was kidnapped”).

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charges.”<sup>38</sup> Examples like this show the consequences of targeting individuals for immigration enforcement based on traits they are born with, places they frequent, profession, or the language they speak.

Reported accounts of interactions between the public and immigration enforcement agents can help California residents understand how these practices may affect California’s diverse communities. For state and local law enforcement agencies, these accounts highlight how immigration enforcement operations may impact the residents in their jurisdictions.

## **B. California Law**

While the Supreme Court’s order in *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* may have opened the door to racially driven immigration enforcement action,<sup>39</sup> California law protects all Californians from racial and identity profiling in state and local law enforcement operations, regardless of immigration status. The Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 (AB 953) explicitly prohibits state and local law enforcement officers from engaging in racial or identity profiling and establishes the Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board (RIPA) to help eliminate such practices.<sup>40</sup> The California Constitution also prohibits law enforcement officers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race and other protected characteristics.<sup>41</sup> California’s prohibition on race and identity profiling by law enforcement is in tension with the Supreme Court’s order in *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo*, which has allowed immigration agents to resume stops and detentions based in part on race, language, profession, and location.

### **1. How the Racial and Identity Profiling Act Restricts the Use of Kavanaugh Stops**

AB 953<sup>42</sup> outlines comprehensive protections against law enforcement stops based on protected characteristics. California Penal Code section 13519.4 (f) directly states that “[a] peace officer shall not engage in racial or identity profiling.”<sup>43</sup> RIPA defines “racial or identity profiling” as “the consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or

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<sup>38</sup> Kunesh, *Native Americans are getting swept up in immigration raids. Homeland Security Secretary Mullin has an opportunity to fix it* (Apr. 17, 2025) Brookings <<https://tinyurl.com/ydcus8us>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>39</sup> “The Supreme Court effectively rubber stamped the executive branch’s practice of engaging in racial profiling, without any meaningful consideration of the harms that result from wrongful stops, arrests, detentions, and deportations,” said Elora Mukherjee, the director of Columbia Law School’s Immigrants’ Rights Clinic” Wise, *ICE Apprehension of US Citizens Derided as ‘Kavanaugh Stops* (Oct. 1, 2025) Bloomberg L. <<https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ice-apprehension-of-us-citizens-derided-as-kavanaugh-stops>> [as of XX, 2026]

<sup>40</sup> The statute defines “racial profiling” as “the consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop, except that an officer may consider or rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description. The activities include, but are not limited to, traffic or pedestrian stops, or actions during a stop, such as asking questions, frisks, consensual and nonconsensual searches of a person or any property, seizing any property, removing vehicle occupants during a traffic stop, issuing a citation, and making an arrest.” Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (e); see *id.*, § 13519.4, subd. (h) (identifying implicit bias as part of what makes up racial or identity profiling).

<sup>41</sup> Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a). Other state laws prohibit state law enforcement discrimination against individuals on the basis of race and other protected characteristics as well. See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 11135.

<sup>42</sup> Codified in Pen. Code, § 13519.4.

<sup>43</sup> Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (f).

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physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop.” This prohibition against racial and identity profiling applies to all law enforcement activities by state and local police including traffic stops, pedestrian stops, questioning, searches, and arrests, except when officers rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description.<sup>44</sup>

Recognizing the harms of racial and identity profiling, AB 953 notes that “[r]acial or identity profiling alienates people from law enforcement, hinders community policing efforts, and causes law enforcement to lose credibility and trust among the people whom law enforcement is sworn to protect and serve.”<sup>45</sup> Because of this, the RIPA Act’s prohibition against profiling applies to all peace officers within California, without exception based on immigration status.

By prohibiting state and local law enforcement officers from conducting stops based on race and identity, AB 953 helps ensure that state and local law enforcement officers have a legitimate reason to stop an individual, rather than relying on assumptions based on appearance, identity, or English proficiency.

## **2. The California Values Act (SB 54) and Joint Law Enforcement Task Forces**

There have been publicly reported concerns that state and local enforcement officers are engaging in or perceived to be engaging in immigration enforcement actions. California state law restricts state and local law enforcement officers from engaging in immigration enforcement actions, with a number of exceptions.<sup>46</sup> For example, the California Values Act (SB 54) permits law enforcement officers to participate in joint task forces with federal agencies if certain conditions are met, including that the primary purpose of the task force is not immigration enforcement.<sup>47</sup>

SB 54<sup>48</sup> defines “immigration enforcement” as “any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person’s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.”<sup>49</sup> It also generally restricts California law enforcement agencies from using agency personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, with a number of exceptions.<sup>50</sup>

Importantly, SB 54’s general restrictions do not prevent a state or local law enforcement agency from conducting enforcement or investigative duties associated with a “joint law enforcement task force,” which, by definition, includes at least one federal law enforcement agency,<sup>51</sup> provided the following conditions are met: (a) the joint task force’s primary purpose is not immigration enforcement; (b) the enforcement or investigative duties are primarily related to a violation of state or federal law unrelated to immigration enforcement; and, (c) participation in the joint task force does not violate any local law or policy to which it is otherwise subject.<sup>52</sup> For

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<sup>44</sup> Pen. Code, §13519.4 subd. (e).

<sup>45</sup> Pen. Code, §13519.4 subd. (d)(3).

<sup>46</sup> Gov. Code, §§ 7284.6, subd. (a)(1)(C), 7282.5, subds. (a), (b).

<sup>47</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6.

<sup>48</sup> SB 54 was signed into law on October 5, 2017, and went into effect January 1, 2018.

<sup>49</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.4, subd. (f).

<sup>50</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (a), (b).

<sup>51</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.4, subd. (g).

<sup>52</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (b)(3)(A)-(C).

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an overview of the various ways SB 54 limits the discretion of California law enforcement agencies to participate in immigration-related activities please review the information bulletin issued by the California Department of Justice Division of Law Enforcement on January 17, 2025 available here: <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-03.pdf>.

California law enforcement agencies must also comply with local laws or agency policies that may impose greater restrictions on their activities than SB 54. The California Department of Justice Division of Law Enforcement has reminded California law enforcement agencies that they should “determine whether, even if SB 54 permits assistance in immigration enforcement related activities, the agency’s policy or local law or policies prohibit such activities.”<sup>53</sup> Further, if a particular activity is prohibited by the agency or the agency’s jurisdiction, the agency “must comply with the more restrictive conditions of the agency or jurisdiction so long as the local law or policy complies with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644, governing restrictions on the exchange of a person’s immigration and citizenship status with government officials.”<sup>54</sup> Among the laws and policies which law enforcement agencies must direct their attention to is, of course, AB 953 and its prohibition on racial and identity profiling. Taken together, SB 54 and AB 953 restrict participation in a joint task force if it entails California law enforcement officers engaging in racial or identity profiling.

Thus, while the Supreme Court concurrence in *Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo* means that federal law enforcement agents may rely on factors (such as an individual’s perceived race or ethnicity, or a person’s language or accent) to form reasonable suspicion to stop an individual and ask about their immigration status, state or local law enforcement officers that participate in joint task forces with federal agencies should be cognizant of RIPA’s prohibition on racial or identity profiling.

#### a. SB 54 Joint Task Force Reports

California law enforcement agencies must submit a report annually to the California Department of Justice if they choose to participate in a joint law enforcement task force where they agree to dedicate personnel or resources on an ongoing basis.<sup>55</sup> The Attorney General reports on the total number of arrests made by joint law enforcement task forces and the total number of arrests made for the purpose of immigration enforcement by all task force participants, including federal law enforcement agencies.<sup>56</sup> The Attorney General’s reporting obligations began on March 1, 2019.<sup>57</sup> Reports on the number of arrests made by joint law enforcement task forces are available here: <https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/resources/publications>.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Div. of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2025-DLE-03, Updated Responsibilities of Law Enforcement Agencies Under the California Values Act, California TRUST Act, and the California TRUTH Act* (Jan. 17, 2025) <<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-03.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>54</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Div. of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2025-DLE-03, Updated Responsibilities of Law Enforcement Agencies Under the California Values Act, California TRUST Act, and the California TRUTH Act* (Jan. 17, 2025) <<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2025-dle-03.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>55</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (c)(1).

<sup>56</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (d).

<sup>57</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (d).

<sup>58</sup> Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (d). Of note, California law enforcement agencies are the owners of the information submitted to the California Department of Justice. Since there is no list or registry of all joint task forces for comparison, the California Department of Justice cannot verify the completeness or accuracy of the data it receives. The information contained in the reports is based on the submissions it receives from law enforcement agencies. The California Department of Justice conducts outreach and quality control reviews, but ultimately California law

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Public awareness of the number of arrests made by joint task forces may be becoming more salient given the current approach to immigration enforcement. The number of arrests made by participants in joint task forces that were reported as arrests made for immigration enforcement purposes increased markedly in 2025. See the progression below:

- **2018:** 13,960 total arrests reported by task force participants, 7 for the purpose of immigration enforcement.<sup>59</sup>
- **2019:** 15,672 total arrests reported by task force participants, 35 for the purpose of immigration enforcement.<sup>60</sup>
- **2020:** 13,737 total arrests reported by task force participants, 1 for the purpose of immigration enforcement.<sup>61</sup>
- **2021:** 13,962 total arrests reported by task force participants, 0 for the purpose of immigration enforcement;<sup>62</sup>
- **2022:** 14,163 total arrests reported by task force participants, 1 for the purpose of immigration enforcement;<sup>63</sup>
- **2023:** 13,760 total arrests reported by task force participants, 0 for the purpose of immigration enforcement;<sup>64</sup>
- **2024:** 18,085 total arrests reported by task force participants, 12 for the purpose of immigration enforcement;<sup>65</sup>
- **2025:** 16,613 total arrests reported by task force participants, 300 for the purpose of immigration enforcement;<sup>66</sup>

If the trajectory continues at this rate, immigration enforcement arrests could represent a larger share of total task force activity in the coming years. This could raise concerns about whether joint task forces are reshaping how AB 953 and SB 54 operate.

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enforcement agencies are responsible for the accuracy of their submissions. The reports issued by the California Department of Justice note this limitation.

<sup>59</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *California Values Act Report 2018* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/values-act-sb54-2018.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>60</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *California Values Act Report 2019* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/SB54%20Pub%202019.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>61</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2020* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/SB54%202020%20Final.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>62</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2021* (Aug. 2022) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/values-act-sb54-2021.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>63</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2022* (Mar. 2023) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/sb54-report-2022.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>64</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2023* (Mar. 2024) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/SB%2054%20Values%20Act%20Report%202023.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>65</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2024* (Feb. 2025) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/sb54-values-act-report-2024.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>66</sup> Cal. Dept. of Justice, *Values Act Senate Bill 54 Annual Report for 2025* (Feb. 2026) <<https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/sb-54-values-act-report-2025.pdf>> [as of XX, 2026].

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## IV. PRESENT DISPARITIES IN POST-STOP ACTIONS BY PERCEIVED ENGLISH FLUENCY

### A. Analysis of 2025 RIPA Data Compared to Prior Years

*[Content in development]*

*This section will build off last year’s analysis of perceived English fluency by looking at what the stop data shows by perceived language and race/ethnicity. The analysis will look at stops where officers perceived individuals as having limited/no English fluency and examine whether there are differences across perceived racial and ethnic groups across different data elements, including actions taken, whether force was used, the outcome of the stop, and the duration of the stop. DOJ will run this analysis for 2025 and for prior years to determine whether there are any changes over time that may be reflected in the data. The hypothesis being explored is that, for some groups, being perceived as having limited English fluency may have a disparate adverse impact across perceived race or ethnicity groups. Stated differently, this analysis explores whether being perceived as having limited English fluency may increase the likelihood of certain adverse actions being taken against members of one racial group more than it increases the likelihood of such actions being taken against members of other racial groups.*

## V. TECHNOLOGIES AND THE FUTURE

This section explores several technologies that may impact the future of racial and identity group profiling and disparities: Automated license plate reader systems, technology-assisted police body-worn camera footage review technologies, and RIPA stop data collection analytics tools. As in the 2026 Annual RIPA Report, the Board addresses automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems in this year’s report as an area requiring further consideration and assessment from the standpoint of racial profiling and disparities. The discussion places particular focus on the concern that California agencies’ ALPR data might contribute to racial profiling by immigration authorities in California, and also notes that connecting private surveillance footage to law enforcement systems carries a risk of private bias leading to racial profiling and disparities by police. The Board also assesses the emerging practice of using technologies to review police body-worn camera footage, and how that practice, when used properly, can aid in various efforts to reduce racial and identity group profiling and disparities. Finally, the Board looks at how California law enforcement agencies can use RIPA stop data collection analytics tools in the future to better equip themselves to act against racial profiling and disparities.

### A. Automated License Plate Reader Technology

As noted in the 2026 RIPA report, automatic license plate reader (ALPR) systems use cameras and computer software to scan the license plates of automobiles captured by their cameras, logging and storing information about the vehicle, such as the time and date and coordinates of the vehicle, and pictures of the vehicle.<sup>67</sup> The Board has recognized that ALPR systems “can be deployed to target communities of color and other marginalized populations,” and there is evidence that ALPR cameras, and the queries that have been run against ALPR system

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<sup>67</sup> 2026 RIPA Board Report, 119 & fn. 207; U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers, Market Survey Report* (June 2025), <<https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers>> [as of XX, 2026]; Finklea, Congressional Research Services, *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (Aug. 19, 2024), 1-2 <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48160>> [as of XX, 2026].

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databases, can contribute to racial profiling.<sup>68</sup> In the 2026 RIPA Report, the Board also recognized that ALPR systems do, or can, deliver public safety benefits and that some proponents of such technologies promote them as tools that may actually help reduce racial and identity profiling and disparities.<sup>69</sup>

This section reviews ALPR systems' expanding capabilities and applications and briefly revisits the concern about ALPR systems targeting communities of color. The section then addresses the concern that California law enforcement agencies' ALPR data may be shared with immigration authorities. This possibility gives rise to the concern that California law enforcement agencies may be facilitating racial profiling in Californians by federal immigration authorities, even if only inadvertently.

## 1. Expanding Capabilities and Uses

ALPR systems are powerful surveillance and investigatory tools that are increasingly used to do much more than just read license plate numbers and check them against "hot lists" of stolen vehicles or other vehicles believed to be associated with certain criminal activity.<sup>70</sup> The U.S. Department of Homeland Security notes that:

ALPR software ranges in complexity from simple smartphone apps that read plates and compare them against user-generated hot lists to sophisticated systems that use machine learning and artificial intelligence to conduct complex analysis. The most sophisticated software can process images, read the plate number, determine the make, model, color and year of a vehicle, compare plates against local and national hot lists, make predictions on probable routes of travel, send localized alerts to law enforcement units in the area, automatically generate vehicle activity reports, and analyze system results to improve future system accuracy.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> 2026 Annual RIPA Report, 120 & fn. 208, 209.

<sup>69</sup> 2026 Annual RIPA Report, 116-117.

<sup>70</sup> Stanley, ACLU, *New Report Highlights How CBP and Border Patrol are Becoming a Repressive Internal Intelligence Agency* (Nov. 24, 2025) <<https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/border-patrol-alpr-dragnet>> [as of XX, 2026] (describing the U.S. Custom and Border Patrol's use of ALPR surveillance system to identify purportedly suspicious movement patterns).

<sup>71</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers, Market Survey Report* (June 2025), 6 <<https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers, Market Survey Report* (June 2025), 1 <<https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers>> [as of XX, 2026] ("With advances in machine learning, computer vision, and artificial intelligence (AI), ALPR systems now can read much more than license plates. ALPR software can detect dents on cars, search for specific bumper stickers, process specialty tags, and recognize rideshare logos"); *id.* at 7 (discussing some systems' capability to use AI to analyze photos and compare them to images in databases); *id.* at 7 (some systems can identify direction of travel and, where there are no egress routes without passing a camera, calculate the amount of time a vehicle remains within a defined area); Finklea, Congressional Research Services, *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (Aug. 19, 2024), 1 <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48160>> [as of XX, 2026] ("Initially, ALPRs were thought of as a tool to help combat automobile theft, but their use has expanded. Agencies use ALPRs for a variety of purposes, including gathering intelligence and evidence, helping identify or apprehend potential suspects in a range of criminal investigations, locating missing or kidnapped individuals, and facilitating crime scene analysis").

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The technology behind ALPR systems is becoming increasingly sophisticated. ALPR cameras may take pictures of individuals in vehicles<sup>72</sup> and may even be installed on law enforcement drones.<sup>73</sup> ALPR systems are also becoming capable of searching for “free-form information” in the photographs they take — “as an example, a ‘red truck with black toolbox mounted on the bed’ or a ‘blue, 4-door hatchback with yellow smiley face bumper sticker.’”<sup>74</sup> The systems are increasingly used as “a critical component in predictive policing,”<sup>75</sup> in which technologies direct law enforcement to areas that have already been receiving a disproportionate share of policing, leading to a prediction of more crime in those areas, an increase in the intensity of policing in such areas, and the possibility of more racial profiling and disparities.<sup>76</sup>

However, ALPR systems are only subject to limited regulations.<sup>77</sup> Existing California law requires a public agency that operates or intends to operate an ALPR system to provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.<sup>78</sup> However, there may be jurisdictions that have significantly expanded their ALPR systems’ functionalities or their uses of their ALPR data since the public had an opportunity to comment. What a legislative body may have approved previously may be significantly different from how the relevant agency has come to use ALPR systems and data. The California Governor vetoed a bill in the Fall of 2025 that would have limited the permissible use of ALPR data to locating vehicles or persons when either are

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<sup>72</sup> Finklea, Congressional Research Service, *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (Aug. 19, 2024), 5 <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48160>> [as of XX, 2026]; Congressional Research Service, *Exposed Data Highlights Law Enforcement Use of Selected Technologies* (Jul. 10, 2019), 1 <<https://tinyurl.com/2e59595y>> [as of XX, 2026]; Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance, Automated License Plate Readers* <<https://sfs.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>73</sup> Lipton, *That Drone in the Sky Could Be Tracking Your Car*, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Sept. 22, 2025) <<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/drone-sky-could-be-tracking-your-car>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>74</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers, Market Survey Report* (June 2025), pp. 9, 16 <<https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers>> [as of XX, 2026]; see *id.* at 15 (“AI is advancing applications such as real-time crime predication [*sic*]”); Finklea, Congressional Research Services, *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (Aug. 19, 2024), 2 <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48160>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Police can also analyze stored LPR data to help identify patterns of suspicious or criminal activity”) (citing International Association of Chiefs of Police report).

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, *Automated License Plate Readers, Market Survey Report* (June 2025), 16 <<https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers>> [as of XX, 2026]; see *id.* at 15 (“AI is advancing applications such as real-time crime predication [*sic*]”); Kristin Finklea, Congressional Research Services, *Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers* (Aug. 19, 2024), 2 <<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48160>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Police can also analyze stored LPR data to help identify patterns of suspicious or criminal activity.”) (citing International Association of Chiefs of Police report).

<sup>76</sup> See 2026 Annual RIPA Report, 119, 124.

<sup>77</sup> See Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a).

<sup>78</sup> Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a).

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reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense.<sup>79</sup> The bill would have limited most data retention to 60 days.<sup>80</sup>

## 2. ALPR Systems and Racial and Identity Profiling and Disparities

As noted above, in its 2026 Report, the Board expressed concern that law enforcement ALPR systems can be deployed to target racial and other identity groups and ALPR databases queried in racially biased ways.<sup>81</sup>

Since that report was published, most of the critical commentary about ALPR systems have been directed at concerns about costs, privacy, over-surveillance, data sharing/security, and lack of transparency, rather than concerns about racial profiling or disparities.<sup>82</sup> Nevertheless, concerns about disproportionate placement of ALPR cameras in certain communities continue to be raised.<sup>83</sup>

One potentially emerging issue is the prospect that private security or surveillance cameras video or photographs might be made available to law enforcement agencies on a large scale through the same databases or platforms where law enforcement ALPR data is stored and searchable.<sup>84</sup> If shared private cameras are disproportionately deployed in communities of color, or if their owners selectively send information about particular racial or other identity groups, such communities and groups could be disproportionately exposed to policing activity as a result. In addition, the expanding capabilities and uses of ALPR systems and data create additional avenues for communities of color and other marginalized populations to be disproportionately targeted and impacted by surveillance and investigatory actions — i.e., new exposures for racially disparate policing, whether intended or not.

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<sup>79</sup> Johnson and Al Elew, *Newsom Just Vetoed a Bill to Regulate License Plate Readers—Even as Fresh Evidence of Misuse Emerges*, CalMatters (Oct. 3, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/aa9ubfev>> [as of XX, 2026]; Governor’s Veto Message <<https://tinyurl.com/33n4pbsz>> [as of XX, 2026]; California Senate Bill No. 274 (2025-2026 Reg. Session) <<https://tinyurl.com/bdc6j9vm>> [as of XX, 2026] (showing how the bill would have amended California’s existing law regulating ALPRs).

<sup>80</sup> Johnson and Al Elew, *Newsom Just Vetoed a Bill to Regulate License Plate Readers—Even as Fresh Evidence of Misuse Emerges*, CalMatters (Oct. 3, 2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/aa9ubfev>> [as of XX, 2026]; Governor’s Veto Message <<https://tinyurl.com/33n4pbsz>> [as of XX, 2026]; California Senate Bill No. 274 (2025-2026 Reg. Session) <<https://tinyurl.com/bdc6j9vm>> [as of XX, 2026] (showing how the bill would have amended California’s existing law regulating ALPRs).

<sup>81</sup> 2026 Annual RIPA Board Report, 120-122.

<sup>82</sup> See sources cited at footnote xxx [this is the note a few down, starting with Finn Hertnett article].

<sup>83</sup> Coleman, Pasadena Now, Residents Raise Privacy, Equity Concerns Over Police Use of Flock Cameras (Mar. 20, 2026) <<https://pasadenanow.com/main/residents-raise-privacy-equity-concerns-over-police-use-of-flock-cameras>> [as of XX, 2026] (resident commented that concentrating cameras in certain city districts “reinforces patterns of overpolicing” and questioned why cameras were “placed in historically working class communities that are immigrant communities that have been heavily targeted by ICE”).

<sup>84</sup> See Hartnett, *The Nationwide Revolt Against Flock Safety Cameras* (Feb. 27, 2026) The New Republic <<https://newrepublic.com/article/206992/flock-safety-cameras-alpr-deflock-resistance-nationwide>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing a partnership that had been planned between a private security camera vendor and a leading police ALPR system vendor that would have allowed the private company users to share footage with the other company’s police ALPR databases); cf. Wroclawski, Consumer Reports, Can Federal Law Enforcement Access Your Ring Doorbell Videos? Here Are the Details, and Your Options (Feb. 13, 2026) <<https://tinyurl.com/vp4ekaf5>> [as of XX, 2026]; Scott, *The LAPD Wants Access to 10,000 Cameras Across the City* (Dec. 22, 2023) Los Angeles Public Press <<https://lapublicpress.org/2023/12/the-lapd-wants-access-to-10000-cameras-across-the-city/>> [as of XX, 2026].

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### 3. California ALPR Data and Racial Profiling by Immigration Authorities

In the 2026 RIPA Report, the Board expressed concern that ALPR data might be shared for immigration enforcement purposes.<sup>85</sup> Since then, public reporting has brought greater attention to the continuing concerns with such sharing, including sharing of California agencies' data that might occur through non-California state or local agencies that are assisting in immigration enforcement.<sup>86</sup>

Where such sharing happens, information such as the places an individual has traveled to can be used to build profiles like those described above, which are also based on race or national origin. Those profiles can then be used to identify individuals to be stopped and questioned about their citizenship and immigration status. California agencies' ALPR data could also be used to help locate individuals whom federal immigration authorities have already identified for detention or investigation based partly on their race or national origin. In other words, if shared for immigration enforcement purposes, California ALPR data can contribute to racial profiling (and unlawful detentions) in federal immigration enforcement taking place in the State of California.<sup>87</sup>

. In view of the foregoing — and also in light of the California laws that prohibit the sharing of ALPR data with non-California entities<sup>88</sup> and generally restricting immigration enforcement assistance<sup>89</sup> — it is important for all California jurisdictions that use ALPR systems to take all reasonable measures to ensure their ALPR data is not being made available for immigration enforcement purposes or contributing to racial profiling in California.

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<sup>85</sup> 2026 Annual RIPA Report, 122-123.

<sup>86</sup> Koebler, 404 Media, Florida's Wildlife Cops are Searching Thousands of Flock Records for ICE (Apr. 2, 2026) ("The practice highlights how ICE, which does not have a contract with Flock, continues to get access to Flock's AI-powered license plate scanning cameras through local and state police, and often in ways that are unusual, unexpected, and difficult for the public to track or hold the agency accountable for"); Hartnett, *The Nationwide Revolt Against Flock Safety Cameras* (Feb. 27, 2026) [The New Republic <https://tinyurl.com/ubpwmptd>](https://tinyurl.com/ubpwmptd) [as of XX, 2026]; Pinsof, Electronic Frontier Foundation, *San Jose Can Protect Immigrants by Ending Flock Surveillance System* (Feb. 12, 2026)  [<https://tinyurl.com/nsfmrv3>](https://tinyurl.com/nsfmrv3) [as of XX, 2026]; *Secure Justice, Blog, Why Are The Alameda County Sheriff And SFPD Sharing So Much Data With 287(g) Agencies?*  [<https://tinyurl.com/56awfeza>](https://tinyurl.com/56awfeza) (Dec. 7, 2025) [as of XX, 2026]; see also Wardwell, Politico, *Liberal Towns Backtrack on License Plate Trackers Amid Concerns About Privacy — and Trump* (Dec. 1, 2025)  [<https://www.politico.com/news/2:025/11/30/license-plate-trackers-pushback-00670550>](https://www.politico.com/news/2:025/11/30/license-plate-trackers-pushback-00670550) [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Gov. Code, § 7284.2, subd. (e) (State and local participation in federal immigration enforcement programs raises constitutional concerns that that California residents could be detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and targeted on the basis of race or ethnicity in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Sharing of California agencies' ALPR data for immigration enforcement purposes is problematic (and unlawful) for other reasons too. Under California law, including the California Values Act, California law enforcement officers are generally restricted from assisting in immigration enforcement, with exceptions related to certain serious or violent crimes. (See Gov. Code, §§ 7282.5, 7284.6. And California law restricts California law enforcement agencies from sharing their ALPR data with federal agencies for immigration enforcement purposes. (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5, subd. (f), 1798.90.55, subd. (b); California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Information Bulletin No. 2023-DLE-06, *California Automated License Plate Reader Data Guidance* (Oct. 27, 2023).) In light of its mandate to work for the elimination of racial and identity profiling, however, the Board is focused on the nexus between the sharing of California agencies' ALPR data and racial profiling, rather than enforcement of the Values Act or the ALPR data-sharing law.

<sup>88</sup> Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5, subd. (f), 1798.90.55, subd. (b).

<sup>89</sup> Gov. Code, § 7282.5.

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Under existing California law, ALPR operators and end-users must “[m]aintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”<sup>90</sup> ALPR operators and end-users must implement a usage and privacy policy meeting specified minimum requirements to ensure the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information “is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.”<sup>91</sup> If they access or provide access to ALPR information, ALPR operators are also required to maintain records pertaining to accessing or providing access to ALPR information, as specified in the law.<sup>92</sup>

As noted, California agencies are prohibited from sharing their ALPR information with non-California agencies.<sup>93</sup> Notwithstanding that rule, agencies can help protect their data by becoming as knowledgeable as possible about how their systems are configured with regard to who is able to access/run searches on their data. Agencies should recognize that even where federal authorities are not themselves able to run a search on a California agency’s data, they may be able to have another entity that has been able to gain such access run the search for them.<sup>94</sup> Another measure that can be taken is to conduct regular audits to identify and log instances in which it appears that searches may have been run on the agency’s data for immigration enforcement purposes. Agencies can also record even just the facts of requests for such searches being made. Agencies can inform and remind their employees about the law against California agencies sharing ALPR data with non-California entities. Employees can be trained, for example, that they are not to run searches on their agency’s ALPR data for anyone other than another California public agency, assuming the agency allows even that. Agencies can also choose to place more restrictions than they currently have on who within the agency is able to access the agency’s ALPR data. An agency can also choose to shorten the amount of time it retains ALPR data.<sup>95</sup>

## **B. Technology-Assisted Body Worn Camera Footage Review**

When used responsibly, technology-assisted police body-worn camera footage review, including platforms marketed to law enforcement agencies, has shown significant promise in helping to eliminate racial and identity profiling and disparities and to improve racial and identity sensitivity in law enforcement. To maximize its potential, camera footage and technological tools to review would need to be available for use outside of law enforcement agencies and individual cases. It is also important to recognize and guard against the risk of the technology being used disproportionately against certain racial or other identity groups as a surveillance or investigatory tool. More generally, the interests in privacy and transparency that are implicated by using technology to review body-worn camera footage collections must be addressed. Costs (including opportunity costs) to state and local jurisdictions must be considered as well. The decision to

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<sup>90</sup> Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.51, subd. (a) (operators), 1798.90.53, subd. (a) (end-users). An “ALPR operator” is “a person that operates an ALPR system,” and, in general, an “ALPR end user is a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system.” *Id.*, § 1798.90.5, subds. (a), (c).

<sup>91</sup> Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.51, subd. (b) (operators), 1798.90.53, subd. (a) (end-users).

<sup>92</sup> Civ. Code, § 1798.90.52.

<sup>93</sup> Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (b); Civ. Code, § 1798.90.5, subd. (f) (definition of “public agency”).

<sup>94</sup> See Center for Human Rights, University of Washington, *Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose Washington Data to Immigration Enforcement* (Oct. 21, 2025), [https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2025/10/21/leaving-the-door-wide-open/#\\_ftnref65](https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2025/10/21/leaving-the-door-wide-open/#_ftnref65) [as of XX, 2026]

<sup>95</sup> Civ. Code, § 1798.90.51, subd. (b)(2)(G) (giving ALPR operator discretion how long to retain ALPR information); Civ. Code, § 1798.90.51, subd. (b)(2)(G) (giving ALPR end-user discretion how long to retain ALPR information).

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have a law enforcement agency purchase and use a technology-assisted review platform should include a public hearing with the opportunity for community input.

## 1. Background

A body-worn camera (BWC) is a small, wearable device that records video and audio. The device's key components include a camera, a microphone, and an internal memory or storage cards for storing recorded footage.<sup>96</sup> Police BWCs record officers' interactions with the public.<sup>97</sup> Recorded footage is typically stored on secure servers or cloud-based platforms.<sup>98</sup> Law enforcement agency usage of body worn cameras is widespread and expected to increase.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Morris, *What is a Body Worn Camera?*, AEANET.org (Nov. 25, 2025) <[https://www.aeanet.org/what-is-a-body-worn-camera/#google\\_vignette](https://www.aeanet.org/what-is-a-body-worn-camera/#google_vignette)> [as of XX, 2026]; Sogade, *Body-Worn Camera Footage Retention and Release: Developing an Intermediate Framework for Public Access in a New Affirmative Disclosure-Driven Transparency Movement*, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 1729, 1734 & fn. 14 (Oct. 2022) <<https://tinyurl.com/y7c37ewf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>97</sup> See, e.g., Kevin Strom, RTI International Police Executive Research Forum, *Research on the Impact of Technology on Policing Strategy in the 21st Century, Final Report* (May 2016), 3-4, <<https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/research-impact-technology-policing-strategy-21st-century-final-report>> [as of XX, 2026]; Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, *Body-Worn Camera Frequently Asked Questions* (2015), 1 <<https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/research-impact-technology-policing-strategy-21st-century-final-report>> [as of XX, 2026]; Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, *Body-Worn Camera Frequently Asked Questions* (2015), 1 <<https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/research-impact-technology-policing-strategy-21st-century-final-report>> [as of XX, 2026]; Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, *Body-Worn Camera Frequently Asked Questions* (2015), 1 <<https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/research-impact-technology-policing-strategy-21st-century-final-report>> [as of XX, 2026]; Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, *Body-Worn Camera Frequently Asked Questions* (2015), 1.

<sup>98</sup> Morris, *What is a Body Worn Camera?* AEANET.org (Nov. 25, 2025) <[https://www.aeanet.org/what-is-a-body-worn-camera/#google\\_vignette](https://www.aeanet.org/what-is-a-body-worn-camera/#google_vignette)> [as of XX, 2026]; Sogade, *Body-Worn Camera Footage Retention and Release: Developing an Intermediate Framework for Public Access in a New Affirmative Disclosure-Driven Transparency Movement*, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 1729, 1735 (Oct. 2022) <<https://tinyurl.com/y7c37ewf>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>99</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2250 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that as of 2020, 79% of all local police officers worked in departments that used BWCs and that use is accelerating among sheriffs and federal law enforcement agencies); Lyons, *California Highway Patrol Lags Local Police, Other States in Officer Body Cams*, Cal Matters (Mar. 3, 2022) <<https://calmatters.org/justice/2022/03/california-highway-patrol-body-cams/>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that CalMatters had queried more than a dozen of California's largest police and sheriff's departments and found that nearly all had at least some body cameras); Byrhonda Lyons, *California Highway Patrol Fell Behind Other Agencies on Body Cams. Now it's Trying to Fix That*, Cal Matters (Jul. 10, 2025) <<https://calmatters.org/justice/2025/07/chp-body-cams/>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that 7,600 California Highway Patrol officers were expected to receive BWCs by March 2026). For additional background on police use of BWCs, see Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing how police BWC use and footage has been largely regulated by police and discussing how police have used BWC footage); Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA*, 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141 (2018) <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026] (discussing different policies regarding when officers activate their BWCs); Strom, RTI International Police Executive Research Forum, *Research on the Impact of Technology on Policing Strategy in the 21st Century, Final Report* (May 2016), 3-4, 4-13 <<https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/research-impact-technology-policing-strategy-21st-century-final-report>> [as of XX, 2026] (general background).

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Projected benefits of police BWCs have included improving public perception of law enforcement legitimacy, improving transparency and accountability, creating training opportunities, and monitoring the success of policing strategies.<sup>100</sup> Studies have shown some apparent effects in terms of BWC use resulting in reductions in use-of-force incidents and civilian complaints about law enforcement encounters.<sup>101</sup> Another hoped-for benefit of police BWCs has been to help reduce racially biased policing, including both intentional disparate treatment and disparate treatment caused by implicit bias.<sup>102</sup> For example, in its 2025 Report, the RIPA Board recommended requiring that BWC footage be used in POST racial and identity profiling training.<sup>103</sup> Information showing that police use of BWCs correlates with reduced civilian complaints might also suggest that police use of BWCs correlates with a lower incidence of perceived biased policing.

There have been critiques that police use of BWCs has not lived up to its promise of improved accountability and transparency. Common criticisms have focused on law enforcement agencies' control over how and when, if ever, BWC footage is released outside the agency and police control over when BWCs are turned on (or activated).<sup>104</sup> Another critique is that police BWC use has drifted toward a technology geared towards criminal investigations.<sup>105</sup> There is concern that

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<sup>100</sup> See, e.g., Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 3-4 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Chapman, *Body-Worn Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us*, National Institute of Justice (Jan. 2019), 1-2 <<https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/body-worn-cameras-what-evidence-tells-us>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Stoughton, *Police Body-Worn Cameras*, 96 N. Car. L. Rev. 1363, 1378-1399 (2018)

<<https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol96/iss5/5/>> [as of May 8, 2026] (discussing potential symbolic, behavioral, and informational benefits from having police use BWCs); Miller et al., *Police Executive Research Forum, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned* (2014), 5-9.

<sup>101</sup> See, e.g., Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 4 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Corley, *Body-Worn Camera Research Shows Drop In Police Use Of Force*, NPR (Apr. 26, 2021)

<<https://www.npr.org/2021/04/26/982391187/study-body-worn-camera-research-shows-drop-in-police-use-of-force>> [as of XX, 2026]; 2024 Annual RIPA Report, 197-198 & fn. 1009-1014.

<sup>102</sup> See, e.g., Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA*, 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141, 171-173 (2018) <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026]; Stoughton, *Police Body-Worn Cameras*, 96 N. Car. L. Rev. 1363, 1370, 1375 (2018)

<<https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol96/iss5/5/>> [as of May 8, 2026]; Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA*, 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141, 144-145, 147-158, 170, 171-172 (2018)

<<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Southerland, *The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Justice System*, 80 Md. L. Rev. 487, 548 (2021)

<<https://tinyurl.com/2p9udusz>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Body-worn cameras were widely adopted to curtail police violence against communities of color”).

<sup>103</sup> 2025 RIPA Board Report, 13; see *id.* at 12, 128, 131 (noting researchers’ recommendation that BWC footage be used to train officers and examine their behavior in the field as part of efforts to address implicit bias and reduce disparities).

<sup>104</sup> See, e.g., Umansky, *The Failed Promise of Police Body Cameras*, New York Times (Dec. 13, 2023) <<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/13/magazine/police-body-cameras-miguel-richards.html>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>105</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2252-2253 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (“[B]ecause rules regarding BWCs have been largely left to police, law enforcement has transformed BWCs into a criminal investigative tool—one that raises serious potential privacy concerns.[] With recent technological advances,

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this drift will be intensified by the use of police BWCs in conjunction with other technologies, including surveillance technologies, to increase law enforcement surveillance over civilians and the resulting intrusions into their lives. In addition, some law enforcement stakeholders have been critical of police BWCs on the ground that they surveil law officers, can intrude on officer privacy, and might result in decreased officer morale and more difficulty in recruiting and retaining officers.

## 2. Emergence of Technology-Assisted BWC Review

The vast amount of police BWC footage that exists offers a trove of information that could be used to learn about and improve policing through review and analysis.<sup>106</sup> But in general, the sheer volume of BWC footage makes manual review of more than a small fraction of existing footage infeasible.<sup>107</sup> Manual review also lacks the ability to detect certain linguistic and behavioral patterns that occur across encounters between police and civilians.<sup>108</sup> Without the capacity to review and analyze footage on a large scale and in depth, the ability to realize BWCs' vast potential has been significantly limited, including with regard to using BWCs to address biased policing.<sup>109</sup>

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police now have the option, often unregulated by law, to add AI analytics capabilities, such as real-time search, facial recognition, and license-plate recognition.”) (footnote omitted).

<sup>106</sup> See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 7 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 2247, 2255, 2259, 2284-2285 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform*, Stanford Report (Oct. 23, 2024) <<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, New York University School of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026]; Fan, *Body Camera, Big Data, and Police Accountability* (2018) 43 *Law & Social Inquiry* 1236 <<https://tinyurl.com/mucx4anv>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>107</sup> See, e.g., Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 2247, 2253, 2257-2259 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform*, Stanford Report (Oct. 23, 2024) <<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024) <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?*, MIT Technology review (Apr. 16, 2024) <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/16/1090846/ai-police-body-cams-cops-transparency/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage*, ProPublica (Feb. 2, 2024) <<https://www.propublica.org/article/police-body-cameras-video-ai-law-enforcement>> [as of XX, 2026]. Jany, *AI Could Become Answer to Studying Bodycam Footage*, Los Angeles Times (Nov. 19, 2023); Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer*, CNA (Mar. 31, 2023) <<https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/03/how-can-body-worn-cameras-maximize-police-accountability>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>108</sup> See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 8 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>109</sup> See, e.g., Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 2247, 2253, 2255 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform*, Stanford Report (Oct. 23, 2024)

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However, speech recognition technology and continuing advances in artificial-intelligence (AI)-driven analytics have made it possible to automate and expand the review and analysis of large volumes of police BWC footage.<sup>110</sup> Automatic speech recognition tools convert BWC audio into text transcripts, and then natural language processing and machine learning models examine the transcripts to identify patterns in language and run analytics.<sup>111</sup> Technologies can also be applied to review and analyze BWC audio and video, rather than just text.<sup>112</sup> Computational linguistic

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<<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?*, MIT Technology review (Apr. 16, 2024) <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/16/1090846/ai-police-body-cams-cops-transparency/>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect*, 114 PNAS No. 25 (Jun. 5, 2017) 6521 <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Left unexamined are the common, everyday interactions between the police and the communities they serve.”).

<sup>110</sup> See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026) 8 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2253-2254 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI’s Role in Policing Reform*, Stanford Report (Oct. 23, 2024) <<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024) <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer*, CNA (Mar. 31, 2023) 2-3, 5, 7 <<https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/03/how-can-body-worn-cameras-maximize-police-accountability>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, New York University School of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>111</sup> See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 1-2 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026]; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2161-2162 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 7 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?*, MIT Technology review, (Apr. 16, 2024) <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/16/1090846/ai-police-body-cams-cops-transparency/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer*, CNA (Mar. 31, 2023) <<https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/03/how-can-body-worn-cameras-maximize-police-accountability>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>112</sup> Srbinovska et al., *Towards AI-Driven Policing: Interdisciplinary Knowledge Discovery from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Jun. 19, 2025) <<https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.20007>> [as of XX, 2026] (introducing a framework demonstrating the potential of combining AI-driven audio, text, and image processing with advanced AI techniques for knowledge discovery from BWC footage); Peterson, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer*, CNA (Mar. 31, 2023) <<https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/03/how-can-body-worn-cameras-maximize-police-accountability>> [as of XX, 2026]; Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 1157 (2021); Rob Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect*, 114 PNAS No. 25 (Jun. 5, 2017), 6525 <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024) 5 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting some vendors’ claims to products that analyze both video and audio).

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methods are applied as part of some analyses.<sup>113</sup>To date there have been several different types and applications of technology-assisted BWC footage review.

### a. Technologies Marketed to Law Enforcement

Some companies market products to law enforcement agencies that will review and analyze the agency's BWC footage.<sup>114</sup> For example, one product automatically transcribes BWC footage audio, analyzes what has been said by officers and citizens, labels noteworthy events, and highlights select events for supervisor review.<sup>115</sup> The platform assigns event labels to identify events including, but not limited to, the officer introducing themselves, providing a reason for a stop, or attempting to de-escalate an interaction with a noncompliant person.<sup>116</sup> Using the community member's speech, the platform labels community members who are upset, noncompliant, or expressing gratitude.<sup>117</sup> The platform assigns labels to report, among other things, persons in crisis, stops where a person is not free to leave, traffic stops, searches, pursuits,

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<sup>113</sup> See, e.g., Lasnier, *Stanford Summit Explores AI's Role in Policing Reform*, Stanford Report (Oct. 23, 2024) <<https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/summit-explores-ai-s-role-in-policing-reform>> [as of XX, 2026]; Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops*, 6 Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics 467, 478 (2018) <<https://aclanthology.org/O18-1033/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect*, 114 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences No. 25 (Jun. 5, 2017) <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>114</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2253-2254 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 3 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; Peterson, Blog, *How Can Body Worn Cameras Maximize Police Accountability: New Analytic Tools Might be the Answer*, CNA (Mar. 31, 2023) <<https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/03/how-can-body-worn-cameras-maximize-police-accountability>> [as of XX, 2026]; Alcorn, *Police Body Cam Maker Unveils New Features it Hopes Will Curb Officer Misconduct*, CNN Business (Oct. 28, 2020) <<https://abc7.com/post/body-camera-police-bodycam-officer/7422266/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Axon, *Priority Ranked Video Audit Settings in Axon Performance*, <<https://www.axon.com/help/axon-performance/software/axon-performance/setup/priority-ranked-video-audit-settings.htm>> [as of XX, 2026]; TrustStat: The World's First Multimodal AI System for the Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Video <<https://www.polis-solutions.ai/services/truststat>> [as of XX, 2026].

Truleo, Virtual Field Training Officer <<https://truleo.co/virtual-fto>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>115</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2261, 2265 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (describing the product as it existed in the Summer of 2024 and noting that it's constantly evolving); see Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 4, 7 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026] (describing the same product); Serrie and Daigle, *Police Departments Across America Using AI to Analyze Officers' Bodycam Video* (Jul. 18, 2023), Fox News <<https://www.foxnews.com/us/police-departments-america-using-ai-analyze-officers-bodycam-video>> [as of XX, 2026] (same); Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?*, MIT Technology review (Apr. 16, 2024) <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/16/1090846/ai-police-body-cams-cops-transparency/>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting that "Police chiefs or supervisors set up lists of keywords or events, get emails and notifications when the system detects these triggers, and then review the footage"); see also 2023 RIPA Board Report, 145 fn. 673 (describing this product as it existed in 2022).

<sup>116</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2263 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>117</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2263 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

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and arrests.<sup>118</sup> Based on these labels, the platform will generate labels that single out positive and negative performances by police officers, which are flagged for supervisor review.<sup>119</sup>

The platform can be used toward the ends of enhancing accountability and public trust, surfacing positive officer-community member interactions to give credit for good work, serving as “a training and coaching tool, with a focus on promoting de-escalation and procedural justice in police-community interactions.”<sup>120</sup> Preliminary evaluation and case studies of agencies using the product have shown an increase in product-measured “high professionalism,” a reduction in unprofessional behavior, and a suggestion that “the technology is associated with reductions in the use of force, civilian non-compliance, and increases in officer explanation.”<sup>121</sup> The product has been used by several California law enforcement agencies.<sup>122</sup>

Another company whose product is used by police claims its “multimodal technology integrates several powerful AI tools to analyze police-community interactions,” using “computer vision” to analyze behavior, natural language processing, and “speech processing to analyze how people are talking to each other.”<sup>123</sup>

These products marketed to police are products that law enforcement agencies could use to study and improve their policing, including as relates to racial and identity profiling and disparities.

## **b. Law Enforcement-Researcher Partnerships**

Some researchers have worked with law enforcement agencies in voluntary partnerships, which points to further potential for law enforcement agencies to improve their policing as relates to racial profiling disparities. One university lab reportedly “works with police departments by reviewing BWC footage and providing recommendations. With the assistance of AI, researchers analyze video to track factors such as the race of officers and people involved, whether officers

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<sup>118</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2263 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>119</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2264 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>120</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2266 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>121</sup> Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 3 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026]; University of South Carolina Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, *Truleo Evaluation Experiment: Executive Summary* (Aug. 28, 2024) <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1F8n7fchn9INKLSY2y6VkfjntMv4TWTsN/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>122</sup> PR Newswire, *Anaheim Police to Deploy Body Camera Analytics* (Apr. 19, 2023) <<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/anaheim-police-to-deploy-body-camera-analytics-301802117.html>> [as of XX, 2026]; Police 1, *Torrance Police Department signs on to receive software for BWC review* (Mar. 2, 2023) <<https://www.police1.com/police-products/body-cameras/press-releases/torrance-police-department-signs-on-to-receive-software-for-bwc-review-LyqJVXkWokuKIqWN/>> [as of XX, 2026]; PR Newswire, *California Police Departments Aim to Improve Policing with Body Camera Analytics* (Jan. 24, 2022) <<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/california-police-departments-aim-to-improve-policing-with-body-camera-analytics-301466017.html>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>123</sup> Polis, *TrustStat* <<https://www.polis-solutions.ai/services/truststat>> [as of XX, 2026]; see also Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2253 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage*, ProPublica (Feb. 2, 2024) <<https://www.propublica.org/article/police-body-cameras-video-ai-law-enforcement>> [as of XX, 2026].

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explained their actions or commands, and whether force was used. AI then identifies correlations between these factors and the outcomes of each encounter. The Lab then shares its findings with police departments, helping to shape training standards and identify areas where policing practices can improve.”<sup>124</sup>

The Los Angeles Police Department has reportedly partnered with university researchers “to develop a new AI-powered tool to examine footage from around 1,000 traffic stops and determine which officer behaviors keep interactions from escalating.”<sup>125</sup> A Stanford University research team reports that it has performed BWC footage analysis for two large California cities.<sup>126</sup>

These partnerships hold out potential to learn information from BWC footage that can be used to try to reduce racial and identity profiling and disparities.

### c. Research and Monitoring Applications<sup>127</sup>

Other technology-assisted BWC footage review applications have been used to gain insights about policing that could be useful to addressing racial profiling and disparities, including studies conducted under the auspices of court-ordered remedial plans.

In one study using body-worn camera footage conducted under the auspices of monitoring a court-ordered settlement, researchers analyzed the respectfulness of police officer language toward White and Black community members during routine traffic stops. The study used computational linguistic methods that extracted levels of respect automatically from transcripts.<sup>128</sup> The study found that officers speak with consistently less respect toward Black versus White community members, even after controlling for the race of the officer, the severity of the infraction, the stop’s location of the stop, and the stops’ outcome.<sup>129</sup> A follow-up study reviewed footage to determine that training had resulted in officers employing more of the

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<sup>124</sup> Policing Project, New York University School of Law, Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Washington State University, CSI Lab Site <<https://labs.wsu.edu/csi/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Washington State University, CSI Lab White Paper <<https://labs.wsu.edu/csi/white-paper/>> [as of XX, 2026] (describing the lab’s methodology and potential benefits); Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage*, ProPublica (Feb. 2, 2024) <<https://www.propublica.org/article/police-body-cameras-video-ai-law-enforcement>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting on the Lab’s work).

<sup>125</sup> Farooq, *Police Departments Are Turning to AI to Sift Through Millions of Hours of Unreviewed Body-Cam Footage*, ProPublica (Feb. 2, 2024) <<https://www.propublica.org/article/police-body-cameras-video-ai-law-enforcement>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Jany, *LAPD Would Delete Nearly 12 Million Body Camera Videos Under Proposed Policy Change*, Los Angeles Times (Jan. 29, 2026).

<sup>126</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 6 <<https://tinyurl.com/bdfrxw75>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>127</sup> Some of the studies discussed here included elements of human review.

<sup>128</sup> Voight et al., *Language from police body camera footage shows racial disparities in officer respect*, 114 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* No. 25 (Jun. 5, 2017) <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026];

<sup>129</sup> Voight et al., *Language from police body camera footage shows racial disparities in officer respect*, 114 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* No. 25 (Jun. 5, 2017) <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026]; See 2025 RIPA Board Report, 130-131 (discussing this study as part of discussion of using police BWC footage to train police).

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officer-communicated-respect techniques recommended for improving police-community interactions.<sup>130</sup>

Researchers in another study used computational linguistics methods to analyze police BWC footage from 577 stops of Black drivers. The researchers found that “stops with escalated outcomes (those ending in arrest, handcuffing, or a search) diverge from stops without these outcomes in their earliest moments—even in the first 45 words spoken by the officer. In stops that result in escalation, officers are more likely to issue commands as their opening words to the driver and less likely to tell drivers the reason why they are being stopped.”<sup>131</sup>

In another set of studies, researchers used traffic stops BWC footage to examine how officers communicate to drivers and whether racial disparities in officers’ communication erode institutional trust in the police, specifically considering officers’ tone of voice. The studies used technology to treat audio so that study participant reviewers were blind to the content of the officer’s words and their interlocutor’s race. Participants evaluated officers’ tone toward White (vs. Black) men more positively.<sup>132</sup> Participants were more likely to categorize officer speech as toward Black drivers as “*talking down*.”<sup>133</sup> The studies “converge[d] on the same finding: police officers communicated more respect, ease, and warmth toward the White men they stopped than they did toward Black men.”<sup>134</sup> The studies also revealed that participants with greater trust in the police rendered more positive judgments of officer prosody.<sup>135</sup> The researchers noted that BWC footage “could be used to analyze low-frequency but high-impact events that disproportionately impact communities of color, such as escalation [e.g., use of force].”<sup>136</sup>

In another study, researchers applied computational dialog methods to police BWC footage to model conversations between police officers and community members in traffic stops and developed a labeling scheme for police speech during traffic stops and a tagger to detect institutional dialog acts (reasons for stops, searches, offering help) from transcribed text. The researchers developed speech recognition and segmentation algorithms to detect these acts at the stop level from raw camera audio. The study “demonstrate[d] that the dialog structures produced by our tagger could reveal whether officers follow law enforcement norms like introducing

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<sup>130</sup> Camp et al., *Leveraging Body-Worn Camera Footage to Assess the Effects of Training on Officer Communication During Traffic Stops* (Sept. 2024) 3 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Nexus 1 <<https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/3/9/pgae359/7756556>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>131</sup> Rho et al., *Escalated Police Stops of Black Men are Linguistically and Psychologically Distinct in Their Earliest Moments*, 120 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (May 30, 2023), 1, 5 <<https://tinyurl.com/mpj6fje5>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>132</sup> Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 1157, 1161 (2021) <<https://tinyurl.com/2yhpfv3k>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>133</sup> Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 1157, 1161 (2021) <<https://tinyurl.com/2yhpfv3k>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>134</sup> Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 1157, 1163 (2021) <<https://tinyurl.com/2yhpfv3k>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>135</sup> Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 1157, 1164 (2021) <<https://tinyurl.com/2yhpfv3k>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>136</sup> Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 1157, 1168 (2021) <<https://tinyurl.com/2yhpfv3k>> [as of XX, 2026].

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themselves, explaining the reason for the stop, and asking permission for searches.”<sup>137</sup> The researchers noted that “knowing which requests the officer makes, whether and when they introduce themselves or explain the reason for the stop is a novel way to measure *procedural justice*; a set of fairness principles recommended by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,[] and endorsed by police departments across the U.S.”<sup>138</sup> The authors further noted that their model allows them to study whether police training has an effect on the kinds of conversations that police officers have with the community.<sup>139</sup>

Another research study was done in connection with litigation challenging the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, which the court found, among other things, revealed a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations and racial profiling during stops.<sup>140</sup> As part of its remedies, the court ordered the use of BWCs, and approved research studies designed to leverage the footage.<sup>141</sup> One of the studies used “AI tools and techniques – including machine learning and natural language processing – to computationally analyze BWC recordings and identify key indicators of constitutional compliance in what NYPD officers say and how they say it during encounters with civilians.”<sup>142</sup> Among other things, the study “analyze[d] the NYPD’s consent search practices for compliance with the Fourth Amendment, which requires that consent be voluntary, an inquiry that turns in part on the language officers use.”<sup>143</sup> To assess compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s discrimination prohibition, “the study analyze[d] differences in officer language during encounters with civilians of different races and ethnicities, from low-level interactions to stops and searches.”<sup>144</sup> The study discussed how machine learning models could be used to raise the rate of identification of undocumented

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<sup>137</sup> Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops*, 6 Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics 467, 467 (2018) <<https://aclanthology.org/Q18-1033/>> [as of XX, 2026] (description from abstract).

<sup>138</sup> Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops*, 6 Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics 467, 467 (2018) <<https://aclanthology.org/Q18-1033/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>139</sup> Prabhakaran et al., *Detecting Institutional Dialog Acts in Police Traffic Stops*, 6 Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics 467, 478 (2018) <<https://aclanthology.org/Q18-1033/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>140</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 1 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>141</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 1 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>142</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 1 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>143</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 1 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>144</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 1-2 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

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stops.<sup>145</sup> The study found that “unreported stops in particular show the largest racial disparities in language use, such that relative to properly documented stops, unreported stops of Black and Hispanic civilians display substantially more linguistic characteristics of constitutional non-compliance.”<sup>146</sup> In addition, the study “reveal[ed] racial disparities in officer language in consent searches including greater use of ambiguous ‘[do you] mind’ questions in encounters with Black civilians and more commands in encounters with Black and Hispanic civilians.”<sup>147</sup> The study also found that “reported encounters of Black and Hispanic individuals” that were not reported as being detentive stops — i.e., stops where the civilian is free to go — were more linguistically similar to stops that were more likely to be detentive stops.<sup>148</sup>

These studies evidence the potential that technology-assisted BWC footage review has to study the existence and potential sources of racial and identity profiling and to contribute to the identification, development, and implementation of potential solutions.

### **3. For The (Potential) Future: Using Technology-Assisted BWC Footage Analysis in the Effort to Reduce Racially Biased Policing**

#### **a. Research Demonstrates Technology-Assisted Reviews and Analysis Can Be Used to Help Bring About Reductions in Racial and Identity Profiling<sup>149</sup>**

The future campaign to reduce racial and identity profiling and disparities in California might include much greater use of technology-assisted BWC footage review.

Research demonstrates that analysis of BWC footage could show possible instances or patterns of biased policing, including racial profiling and implicit bias, and could show patterns of officer speech or interactions, or events, occurring during stops that have an adversely disparate impact on certain groups.<sup>150</sup> Researchers have used technology-assisted BWC footage review to identify

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<sup>145</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 2-3 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>146</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 3-4, 42-43 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>147</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 4-5, 73, 64 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026]. (“Implicit search requests—and confusing framing—are most likely to occur in consent search requests of Black and Hispanic civilians and are markedly less common in requests of White civilians. Alongside our findings on ‘stop-like’ interactions in the first aim, they suggest a more investigatory tenor to NYPD encounters with communities of color”).

<sup>148</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 2, 5, 41, 44, 66, 67, 73 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>149</sup> This Report neither endorses nor disapproves law enforcement use of BWCs but rather takes their use by many California law enforcement agencies as a given for present purposes.

<sup>150</sup> See, e.g., Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 67 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>>

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training opportunities related to biased policing, including the revealing of practices that have racially disparate impacts, to assess the extent to which officers are implementing training and policies related to biased policing.<sup>151</sup> Further, the available research demonstrates that law enforcement agencies could use BWC analysis to evaluate the extent to which certain reforms or training, when implemented, may be effective in reducing racial and identity group profiling or disparities.<sup>152</sup>

Even where no information suggesting disparate treatment is found, analyses showing what types of speech or actions correlate with stops elevating to more intrusive actions — e.g., search requests, searches, use of force, ordering car occupants out of the car, ordering pedestrians to sit down, etc. — can be used to inform strategies for reducing the incidence of such actions, which may be experienced at disproportionately high rates by certain racial, ethnic, or other identity groups. Technology-assisted BWC footage analysis might also be able to help police and researchers learn more about what causes perceptions of biased policing, which perceptions are also important to understand and address.<sup>153</sup>

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[as of XX, 2026] (“these findings [from technology-assisted BWC footage review] extend the Monitor’s prior analyses, which showed racial disparities in how often stops occur, by demonstrating disparities in how encounters unfold in practice. These patterns point to differential treatment reflected in officer language and, while they do not establish discriminatory intent, they are consistent with the concerns about racially disparate policing that animate the Court’s remedial orders.”); New York Times, *White Drivers Got a Warning. Latino Drivers Got Detained.*, (Apr. 29, 2026) (reporting that a *New York Times* review of 50 hours of Immigration and Customs Enforcement BWC footage from a single night in Nashville, Tennessee revealed “a pattern of overt racial profiling”); see also 2023 RIPA Board Report, 91 (discussing Los Angeles Office of the Inspector General audit of Los Angeles Police Department stop data and BWC footage that revealed that some portion of racial disparities observed in stops and actions taken following stops were the result of pretext stops); *id.* at 145 (“Analysis of body-worn camera footage is also a method to detect and prevent problematic practices through review of aggregated data.[] Body-worn camera footage can reveal recurring challenges and patterns across cases.”) (footnote omitted).

<sup>151</sup> See, e.g., Julian R. Murphy, Note, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA*, 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141, (2018), <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of May 7, 2026as of XX, 2026]; cf. Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 14-15. <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of May 12, 2026as of XX, 2026]; Camp et al., *Leveraging Body-Worn Camera Footage to Assess the Effects of Training on Officer Communication During Traffic Stops* (Sept. 2024) 3 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Nexus 1, <<https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/3/9/pgae359/7756556>> [as of May 20, 2026as of XX, 2026]. While the 2025 RIPA Board Report touched on this aspect of using BWC footage (2025 RIPA Board report, 130-131), the more specific focus of this Report is the use of technology-assisted BWC footage review.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 6 & fn. 67 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>153</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: A Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2255 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that BWC data is a “public resource” related to public safety and policing because it can show challenges to law enforcement officers, provide information for community oversight and others, and can be used as a training resource and as a resource for academic study); *id.* at 2259 (“external actors could use the platform to evaluate the policing agencies’ practices and policies, including whether the agency is implementing new laws or trainings, the terms of a consent decree, departmental policies, and much more”); *id.* at 2285 (“The possibilities of what we might

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In addition, in the RIPA context, a concern raised by law enforcement regarding the use of stop data alone to identify patterns of potential racial bias in the use of force is that such studies do not measure the origin of the force — i.e., was the force proactive by the officer or reactive to a show or use of force by the person stopped.<sup>154</sup> Technology-assisted footage review and analysis — including automated analysis of both audio and video — may make it possible to provide or estimate that measure and thereby to perform studies that can more accurately determine whether racial or other identity group disparities in use of force are attributable to racial or other identity group bias, whether intentional or implicit.

Similarly, technology-assisted review could be used to better identify the officer’s claimed legal justification for conducting a search, which would address another law enforcement suggestion for how to supplement the currently collected RIPA data elements to facilitate more reliable measures of patterns of racial or other identity group bias in police searches.<sup>155</sup> Also on the subject of searches, the New York City Police Department stop study discussed above shows that it is possible to layer on to RIPA data regarding searches reported as consensual a qualitative layer of analysis that looks at whether there are disparities in how different racial or other identity groups are asked for consent.<sup>156</sup>

Below the level of aggregate analyses, there is also the potential for technology-assisted BWC footage review to provide police leadership with opportunities for coaching, commendation, problem-detection, and, where warranted, corrective action — and as discussed above, some law enforcement agencies, including California agencies, are already using technology for some of these purposes. It might be possible to use technology-assisted BWC footage review to audit RIPA stop entries for accuracy as to some of the data elements and to audit, or assist in auditing, for unreported stops.<sup>157</sup> For example, technology-assisted BWC footage review could be used to determine the extent to which an agency’s officers are giving the person stopped a reason for why they were stopped.<sup>158</sup>

To be clear, technology-assisted BWC footage analysis is no panacea. Standing alone, it will not reduce racial identity profiling or disparities (though there could be some positive effect simply from officers knowing that *all* their BWC footage is being reviewed and analyzed). But there

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learn from the data are essentially limitless. . . . [¶] Academic researchers working with departments have unlocked a trove of insights from even relatively small sets of BWC footage”).

<sup>154</sup> Police Officers Research Association of California, *Nation-Leading Racial Profiling Expert Finds Significant Flaws in Original Analysis of California Racial & Identity Profiling Board’s Stop Data* (Jan. 1, 2024), 1; Brian L. Withrow, *Efficacy of the California Department of Justice & Resident Contact Data Set for Evaluating Police Stops*, 5. To facilitate the envisioned analysis, it might be necessary for officers to state why they are conducting a search so the claimed legal basis for the search is recorded.

<sup>155</sup> Police Officers Research Association of California, *Nation-Leading Racial Profiling Expert Finds Significant Flaws in Original Analysis of California Racial & Identity Profiling Board’s Stop Data* (Jan. 1, 2024), 1; Brian L. Withrow, *Efficacy of the California Department of Justice & Resident Contact Data Set for Evaluating Police Stops*, 3.

<sup>156</sup> Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 4-5, 73 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>157</sup> Cf. Voight et al., *What Can AI Tell Us About NYPD Street Stops? Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning to Analyze Investigative Encounters and Consent Searches from Police Body-Worn Camera Footage* (Apr. 2026), 2-3 <<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sn9MLYG5vdwVVXTHwG4VhUR-ez79TVEU/view>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>158</sup> See generally Gov. Code, § 12525.5, subd. (b)(3) (requiring peace officers to report the reason given to the person stopped at the time of the stop).

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appears to be significant potential for these tools to be a valuable part of a suite of efforts to reduce racially biased policing.

### **b. Access to BWC Footage and Police Review Platforms**

In a recent article about technology-assisted BWC footage review, the authors write:

By transcribing and annotating every recorded police encounter . . . [technology-assisted review] platforms . . . can help begin to unlock perhaps the greatest untapped reservoir of data about policing in our country. It is a huge waste for communities to pay for BWCs and then ignore the insights these data might offer. But to capture this full potential, we must rethink traditional notions of who owns BWC footage . . . [W]e believe this information should be treated as “civic data,” owned by the public, not by the police. And, as civic data, we believe that — with due respect to concerns such as officer privacy — that data should be made far more widely available for research and training purposes.<sup>159</sup>

The RIPA Board shares this view.

It is not enough to harness technology-assisted review’s potential to help reduce racially biased policing that law enforcement agencies have access to BWC footage and technological tools to review it.<sup>160</sup> Broader access to footage and review platforms is required. For example, policymakers could require, “at the time of purchase, that BWC analytics platforms adopted by police also be made available to prosecutors, public defense offices, and oversight entities in the jurisdiction.”<sup>161</sup> Access to footage might not be equal — the authors referenced above suggest that footage might be made available with court authorization or by legislation — but such entities would “not be at a technological disadvantage when it comes to review BWC

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<sup>159</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2284-2285 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; *id.* at 2286-2288 (discussing the status quo under which law enforcement agencies act as BWC footage owners and controllers); see Southerland, *The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Justice System*, 80 Md. L. Rev. 487, 548 (2021) <<https://tinyurl.com/2p9udusz>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Yet for all of the accountability promised [by police body-worn cameras], the institutional actors holding the tools of accountability have not changed, which means the tools have not been able to meet their potential.”).

<sup>160</sup> See, e.g., Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?*, MIT Technology review, (Apr. 16, 2024) <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/16/1090846/ai-police-body-cams-cops-transparency/>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that outsiders don’t know what terms police are searching for, reporting one researcher’s comments that “[p]olice departments have little incentive to ask pointed questions about racial bias,” and stating that, “[t]he promise of these bodycam-to-text programs won’t be fully met if key terms, phrases, and interactions aren’t commonly tagged and analyzed”); see also Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2282 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; *id.* at 2270-2271 (discussing how one leading platform’s product and messaging has changed over time in response to pushback from line officers and law enforcement labor organizations).

<sup>161</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2282 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; *id.* at 2286-2288 (discussing the status quo in which law enforcement agencies act as BWC footage owners and controllers).

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footage.”<sup>162</sup> Further, the discussion above shows the value of making BWC footage available to researchers.<sup>163</sup>

The authors referenced above discuss what a regime of expanded access to BWC footage might look like, including a “data trust” model, under which controls are set on who has access to footage and the nature of different users’ access.<sup>164</sup> Any access regime must also protect privacy rights and interests.<sup>165</sup>

The extent to which the public might be able to access California police BWC footage under the State’s public records law is beyond the scope of this Report. However, relevant information includes the following. Under current California law, law enforcement agencies, departments, or entities establishing policies and procedures for the implementation and operation of a body-worn camera system are required to consider various “best practices regarding the downloading and storage of body-worn camera data,”<sup>166</sup> including that such data be considered the property of the law enforcement agency, and “shall not be accessed or released for any unauthorized purpose.”<sup>167</sup> This statute does not limit the public’s right to access recorded data under the California Public Records Act.<sup>168</sup> Generally, the California Public Records Act does not require the disclosure of law enforcement investigation records.<sup>169</sup> That Act has a specific provision regulating when BWC footage related to a “critical incident,” as defined in the Act, may be withheld.<sup>170</sup>

In sum, to better utilize the potential for using technology-assisted BWC footage review to help study and ameliorate racial and identity profiling and disparities, it is generally beneficial to have access to large collections of footage spanning meaningful periods of time.

### c. Retaining BWC Footage for Study

In general, having a large volume of police BWC footage to review — including a collection that covers enough time to encompass potentially relevant changes in law, policies, practices, and training — will increase the potential learning opportunities such footage may offer where

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<sup>162</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 2247, 2286-2288 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>163</sup> In most of the studies discussed above, the law enforcement agencies included in the study volunteered to make their footage available to researchers. In the New York City stop-and-frisk litigation, the footage was provided under the court’s remedial orders.

<sup>164</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 2247, 2288-2291 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>165</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 2247, 2290-2291 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (“[I]n making BWC footage available, it is essential to protect the rights of both officers and members of the public captured on such footage. Police officers are unusual in that their every move may be captured by audio and sometimes video. Their unique role as public guardians may justify this scrutiny. Still, they retain their rights to a certain amount of privacy and any release of BWC footage must be done in a way that respects this interest. The same is true of members of the public caught on footage”).

<sup>166</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b).

<sup>167</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(8).

<sup>168</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (d).

<sup>169</sup> Gov. Code, § 7923.600, subd. (a).

<sup>170</sup> Gov. Code, § 7923.625. Footage relates to a “critical incident” if it depicts an incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer or an incident in which the use of force by a peace officer or custodial officer against a person resulted in death or in great bodily injury. Gov. Code, § 7923.625, subd. (e).

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technology is being leverage to perform the review and analysis.<sup>171</sup> At the same time, storage costs are obviously a consideration.

Under California law, agencies establishing policies and procedures for BWC systems must consider the following “best practices.”<sup>172</sup> First, the following footage should be retained for at least two years: (1) footage of incidents involving the use of force or an officer-involved shooting; (2) footage of an incident that leads to an individual’s detention or arrest; and, (3) footage relevant to a formal or informal complaint against a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement agency.<sup>173</sup> Second, footage that may be relevant to a criminal prosecution should be retained for the same time that other evidence that may be relevant to a criminal prosecution must be retained.<sup>174</sup> Third, in general, all other footage should be retained for at least 60 days.<sup>175</sup>

#### **d. Surveillance, Criminal Investigation, and Disparate Policing**

The 2026 Annual RIPA Report discussed the need to consider how technologies used by law enforcement may be concentrated on certain racial groups and the harm that can follow.<sup>176</sup> Technology-assisted BWC footage review warrants the same circumspection. In particular, the use of technology-assisted BWC footage review by police poses risks to civilian privacy — heightened by the potential integration of other surveillance technology tools — and raises the possibility that the technology will be used as a law enforcement surveillance and investigation tool, despite BWCs’ original purposes being to improve police training, accountability, and transparency.<sup>177</sup> This risk will be greater for communities that are already disproportionately

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<sup>171</sup> See generally Mary D. Fan, *Body Camera, Big Data, and Police Accountability* (2018) 43 Law & Social Inquiry 1236 <<https://tinyurl.com/mucx4anv>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>172</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b).

<sup>173</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(B).

<sup>174</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(C).

<sup>175</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(A).

<sup>176</sup> California Racial and Identity Profiling Board, 2026 Annual Report (Jan. 30, 2026), 114-124, available at <https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board/reports> [as of May 15, 2026].

<sup>177</sup> “A paramount concern with platforms that transcribe and analyze BWC footage is that they will further the use of BWCs as a surveillance or criminal investigative tool. BWC footage contains a tremendous amount of data on members of the public—the technology captures their movements, statements made to police, and conversations with one another, among other things. As such, BWCs themselves present serious privacy risks.[] A platform that aggregates and analyzes all of an agency’s BWC footage, making it more widely accessible and easily searchable, could prove useful to investigators, but also would amplify these privacy risks.” Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2267-2268 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (footnote omitted); *id.* at 2252-2253 (“because rules regarding BWCs have been largely left to police, law enforcement has transformed BWCs into a criminal investigative tool—one that raises serious potential privacy concerns.[] With recent technological advances, police now have the option, often unregulated by law, to add AI analytics capabilities, such as real-time search, facial recognition, and license-plate recognition.”) (footnote omitted); Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 5 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026] [noting concerns centered on civilians’ privacy]; Sisson, *AI Was Supposed to Make Bodycams Better. What Happened?*, MIT Technology review, (Apr. 16, 2024) <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/16/1090846/ai-police-body-cams-cops-transparency/>> [as of XX, 2026] (reporting concerns that potential to use AI technology for purposes other than accountability raises significant questions that must be addressed and that the technology “opens up law enforcement’s frame of surveillance” in a way that must be dealt with); see also Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2255 <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (commending the currently leading BWC footage review platform

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policed.<sup>178</sup> And it is reasonable to expect that such communities will be disproportionately impacted by law enforcement actions and privacy incursions that follow from using technology-assisted BWC footage review as a surveillance and investigatory tool directed at civilians.

#### e. Other Privacy Issues

Because technology-assisted BWC footage review increases the amount of footage reviewed by humans, law enforcement officer privacy protections “are a relevant consideration.”<sup>179</sup> It has been suggested that law enforcement agencies “should be transparent when using BWC analytics, making clear to officers the purpose of the tool, the information it will analyze, and the sorts of judgments it (with supervisor review) will make.”<sup>180</sup> In addition, vendor analytics products can and should provide officer and citizen privacy protections as appropriate to the context — e.g., not revealing personally identifiable information where it is not needed.<sup>181</sup> Computational linguistic models and other research methods for studying BWC footage can use techniques to protect officer and community member privacy.<sup>182</sup>

#### f. Democratic Authorization

Researchers have advocated for law enforcement agencies to employ the concept of “democratic authorization,” or an analysis of the impact to the rights and public safety of individuals, to

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marketed to law enforcement for “design[ing] its platform to mitigate the chance it will drift toward investigative or surveillance uses”); Policing Project, New York University School of Law, Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Jurisdictions should set clear rules governing how agencies can use BWC analytics and should make clear that these tools, which are adopted for accountability purposes, cannot be repurposed for surveillance.”)

<sup>178</sup> Cf. *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2283 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (considering the possibility of prohibiting police BWC analytics presenting an outsized risk to “equity”).

<sup>179</sup> *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2284 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; see Watts et al., *Automating Body-Worn Camera Footage Review Through AI: Preliminary Findings From a Multi-Site Randomized Control Trial* (Aug. 14, 2024), 5 <<https://tinyurl.com/5ccffevj>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that police have raised concerns about officer privacy).

<sup>180</sup> *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2284 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]

<sup>181</sup> See *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2284 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, New York University School of Law, Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026] (“Data privacy is another critical concern. BWC footage often contains sensitive personal information—for example, an individual’s address or phone number. To protect individual privacy, and because such information is not needed for BWC footage to serve accountability or research ends, any system or program that analyzes BWC footage should ensure personally identifiable information is redacted before it reaches human reviewers.”).

<sup>182</sup> Voight et al., *Language from Police Body Camera Footage Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect*, 114 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 6521, 6524, 6525 (Jun. 5, 2017) <<https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1702413114>> [as of XX, 2026]; Camp et al., *The Thin Blue Waveform: Racial Disparities in Officer Prosody Undermine Institutional Trust in the Police*, 121 *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition* 1157, 1159-1160 (2021); see also Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2291 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026] (noting that in a “data trust” model for sharing BWC footage, “[r]esearchers might get access only to audio transcript, keeping officer and public identities confidential”).

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determine whether to implement technologies, including products that permit LEAs to review and analyze BWC footage.<sup>183</sup> The democratic authorization process, including providing an opportunity for public input and debate, ensures transparency and strengthens public trust in law enforcement’s use of these technologies; absent such a process, law enforcement agencies run the risk of undermining public trust and could face backlash.<sup>184</sup>

As noted above, with regard to automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems, California law requires a public agency that operates or intends to operate an ALPR system to provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.<sup>185</sup> The California Legislature could enact similar legislation related to the purchase and use of technology-assisted BWC footage review tools. Regarding expanded access to BWC footage for study and analysis using technology-assisted BWC footage review, if this matter is to be left to local jurisdictions to decide, the legislature could again impose a public notice and comment opportunity requirement.

### **g. Transparency**

Transparency with communities and policymakers can be facilitated by vendors of technology-assisted BWC review disclosing products how their products work, including how the vendor developed its artificial intelligence models and how it validated its outputs.<sup>186</sup> Law enforcement agencies can “develop, implement, and make public a use policy that explains how officers and supervisors are to use the platform,” and “make public at least aggregate data gleaned from their use of the platform.”<sup>187</sup> Legislative bodies can require such disclosures and policies, which can also respond to privacy concerns and other civil liberties issues.<sup>188</sup>

California law currently requires law enforcement agencies to consider some “best practices” in establishing policies and procedures for their BWC systems that may be relevant to transparency issues arising from using technology-assisted footage review (including third-party researchers), including, but not limited to: (1) that records or logs of footage access should be retained permanently;<sup>189</sup> (2) that where an agency uses a third-party vendor to manage storage, the agency

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<sup>183</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2279 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]; Policing Project, New York University School of Law, *Rethinking Response Part Two: AI to Analyze Body Worn-Camera Footage* (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/5n6ha2t5>> [as of XX, 2026]; *ibid.* (“when police obtain and use technology without permission or transparency, there can be backlash. This undermines public trust and sometimes ends up depriving police of a tool that might have furthered community safety.”); cf. Murphy, *Is it Recording?—Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA*, 9 Colum. J. of Race and L. 141, 180 (2018) <<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjrl/article/view/2238>> [as of XX, 2026] (proposing model policy for police BWC activation and asserting that, “[a]ny efforts to adopt this model ought to be preceded by meaningful community consultation, especially with regard to the countervailing privacy interests”).

<sup>184</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2279 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026]

<sup>185</sup> Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a).

<sup>186</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2281 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>187</sup> Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo’s AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2281 (2025) <<https://tinyurl.com/y5ra98kw>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>188</sup> See, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5-1798.90-55 (statutes regulating use of ALPR systems); Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b) (statute requiring consideration of best practices for issues related to downloading and storage of police BWC footage).

<sup>189</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(E).

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should consider whether the vendor is using a system that has a built-in audit trail to prevent data tampering and unauthorized access,<sup>190</sup> and, (3) that footage “shall not be accessed or released for any unauthorized purpose.”<sup>191</sup>

### C. Stop Data Analytics Tools for Law Enforcement Agencies

The RIPA Board seeks a future in which agencies are better able to make use of their RIPA stop data to improve outcomes, with the ultimate objective being to eliminate racial or identity profiling and disparities. Stop data analytics tools that are available to agencies — whether offered by third-party vendors, developed by agencies themselves, or provided by researchers or consultants — would likely be a part of this future.

Having RIPA data analytics tools puts agencies in a better position to identify racial disparities that may be indicative of racial profiling and to assess what might be causing observed disparities and how they might be addressed. Data analytics tools might also help to identify subsets of stops that warrant deeper study through the types of technology-assisted BWC footage review discussed above, either by focusing third-party vendor review tools on those stops, or by having interested researchers perform such work. Agencies equipped with analytics tools may similarly be in a better position to assess what they are doing that might be reducing racial and identity profiling or disparities. If nothing else, for any given agency, data analytics tools can be used to enhance public reporting of an agency’s RIPA stop data.

#### 1. Stop Data Analytics Tools

Some California law enforcement agencies use products offered by third-party vendors for their officers to record their RIPA stop data. Such vendors may offer associated product features that enable agencies to gather (and report) analytics on their RIPA data on a continuous basis.<sup>192</sup> While the RIPA Board does not recommend any particular product or tool, one product offering states that it can such tools may be used to show stop data by year, month, race, use of force, and other data elements, to provide detailed demographic breakdowns by race or other identity groups, and to show data regarding reasons for stops, stop results, and search data.<sup>193</sup> Marketing materials suggests the software can be configured to run customized RIPA data analytics for an agency based on its areas of interest.<sup>194</sup> Agencies that find a need for third-party products should undertake research of available offerings to fit their RIPA reporting needs.

Some agencies use their own technology or forms for their officers to record their RIPA stop data. Depending on its resources, such an agency may be able to run its own RIPA stop data analytics. Indeed, in general, any agency, *provided it has the resources*, is capable of analyzing its own RIPA stop data, whether the agency uses its own tools to record stop data or a third-party vendor’s tool.

In addition to what agencies may do on their own, each year’s RIPA Report includes disaggregated statistical data for each reporting law enforcement agency reported by the California Department of Justice.<sup>195</sup> This data is only reported on an annual basis, however, and

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<sup>190</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(7)(C).

<sup>191</sup> Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(8).

<sup>192</sup> Veritone, Inc., *Veritone Introduces Contact Analytics for California Law Enforcement to Enhance Real-Time Data Insights and Strengthen Public Trust* (Jan. 9, 2025) <<https://www.veritone.com/newsroom/press-releases/contact-analytics/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (j)(3)(E).

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does not include any time series data or longitudinal analyses. The types of RIPA stop data analytics tools under discussion here may be more robust in these regards.

## 2. Agency Disclosures Reflecting the Use of Stop Data Analytics Tools

Some California law enforcement agencies publish their reported RIPA stop statistics.<sup>196</sup> For example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has an online RIPA data information data dashboard/interactive database that gives nearly up-to-date numbers and statistics and includes a filtering function to view data disaggregated by calls for service versus deputy-initiated calls, bicycle stops, vehicle stops, pedestrian stops, station name, and city/area.<sup>197</sup> The data can also be viewed for viewer-selected date ranges.<sup>198</sup> This dashboard/interactive database is reflective of the types of data (and filtered data) that can be generated with the types of stop data analytics tools under discussion here.

One private website reflects the use of data analytics tools to show agency-level RIPA stop data for a large collection of California agencies, including some statistical disparities measures, including data filtered by year, which facilitates year-over-year comparisons.<sup>199</sup>

## 3. Using Analytics Tools to Improve Outcomes

Provided they have the resources, agencies can acquire or apply stop data analytics tools to the raw RIPA stop data they are collecting for RIPA reporting requirements to go beyond merely generating numbers and statistics that are not contextualized.<sup>200</sup> Tools that enable agencies to generate and publish statistics related to particular areas, organizational units, officers, types of stops, time periods, or other stop data elements, alone or in combination, can be used to provide agencies, policymakers, civilian oversight entities, community members, and researchers with potentially valuable insights.<sup>201</sup> Analytics tools that facilitate analyses by time periods in particular are useful insofar as they make it possible to compare data (e.g., racial and identity group statistical disparities) from before the date that a relevant reform or other event was

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<sup>196</sup> Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, AB 953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026]; San Francisco Police Department, Police Department Stop Data <[https://data.sfgov.org/Public-Safety/Police-Department-Stop-Data/ubqf-aqzw/about\\_data](https://data.sfgov.org/Public-Safety/Police-Department-Stop-Data/ubqf-aqzw/about_data)> [as of XX, 2026] (data reportedly updated quarterly); see also Los Angeles Police Department, LAPD Community RIPA Dashboard <<https://www.lapdonline.org/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026] (online "RIPA dashboard" but reporting pages blocked without a valid account sign-in as of XX, 2026). The City of Oakland Police Department publishes annual stop data statistics reports on its website. City of Oakland, Data from Police Officer Visits and Stops <<https://www.oaklandca.gov/Public-Safety-Streets/Police/OPD-Data/Data-from-Police-Officer-Visits-and-Stops>> [as of XX, 2026]. The Board has not verified the accuracy of the data in these sources.

<sup>197</sup> Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, AB 953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>198</sup> *Id.*

<sup>199</sup> RIPA Explorer, Agency Explorer <<https://ripastops.org/agency/CA0431400>> [as of XX, 2026]. The Board has not determined whether all RIPA-reporting agencies are included in this interactive database tool. The Board has not verified the data on this site.

<sup>200</sup> Veritone, Inc., *Veritone Introduces Contact Analytics for California Law Enforcement to Enhance Real-Time Data Insights and Strengthen Public Trust* (Jan. 9, 2025) <<https://www.veritone.com/newsroom/press-releases/contact-analytics/>> [as of XX, 2026]; Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, AB 953 - R.I.P.A Stop Data Information Dashboard <<https://lasd.org/transparency/ripa-dashboard/>> [as of XX, 2026].

<sup>201</sup> See generally Pryor, et al., *Collecting, Analyzing, and Responding to Stop Data: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement Agencies, Government, and Communities* (2020), <https://www.policingproject.org/stopdata> [as of xx, 2026].

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implemented or occurred with data from after that date.<sup>202</sup> Trends may be more readily identified when agencies have the ability to see their stop data in real time or to run comparisons across time periods. It is not possible to design and implement interventions in response to trends if the trends are not observed.

#### 4. Other Considerations

Similar to the case of technologies for reviewing police BWC footage, discussed above, a process of democratic authorization, including community review and input, may be appropriate before a law enforcement agency makes any significant expenditure to acquire (or develop) stop data analytics tools.<sup>203</sup> Decisionmakers can also consider hearing from various stakeholders about the types of stop data analyses the agency should be running and the format and functionalities desired of data dashboards or other reporting systems to be provided by the agency.

There are also transparency considerations.<sup>204</sup> The values of trust and accountability can be served when agencies (and third-party vendors, as applicable) are transparent about the data they are using, how any non-obvious aspects of their analytics tools operate, how they are resolving any significant data issues, how various terms used in their reporting are defined, and what the various data fields they show are capturing. Agencies using stop data analytics tools can also be transparent about how they are using the tools and the data they generate to try to reduce racial and identify profiling and disparities. Agencies can also help justify their investments in stop data analytics tools by disclosing the analyses they are generating and by making the tools available to non-agency actors, as through interactive online dashboards and databases.

## VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

*[Area for Board discussion. Below are potential policy recommendations based on the research and data discussed above, for the Board's consideration and input.]*

### Potential recommendations related to Kavanaugh stops

1. *All law enforcement agencies covered by AB 953 shall adopt policies prohibiting racial or identity profiling that include the RIPA definition of "racial or identity profiling" and all officers should be trained on that definition.*

### Potential recommendations related to perceived English fluency

2. *Law enforcement agencies should consider creating standardized language-need protocols for officers to use as a structured tool to identify language needs rather than making on-the-spot judgments. This could reduce the risk that race shapes assumptions about who need language support.*

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<sup>202</sup> See 2026 Annual RIPA Report, 125-151 (comparing stop data and statistics before and after policy reforms).

<sup>203</sup> Cf. Civ. Code, § 1798.90.55, subd. (a) (requiring an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting before implementing an automated license plate reader program; Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2279-2280 (2025), <https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1703/> [as of xx, 2026]; see generally Barry Friedman, *Democratic Policing* (2015) 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1827, 1832-1835.

<sup>204</sup> Cf. Heydari et al., *Putting Police Body-Worn Camera Footage to Work: a Civil Liberties Evaluation of Truleo's AI Analytics Platform*, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 2247, 2281-2282 (2025), <https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1703/> [as of xx, 2026] (discussing transparency issues related to use of technology-assisted police body-worn camera review).

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3. *Law enforcement agencies should acquire and use real-time translation technology, if non-English fluency is having a disproportionate impact on a particular racial or ethnic group.*

Potential recommendations related to ALPR systems

4. *The Legislature should amend Civil Code section 1798.90.55, subdivision (a), to provide: (1) that a public agency that operates an automated license plate reader system and that intends to expand the functionalities or uses of the system or the information it collects beyond what was disclosed in a prior noticed meeting of the agency's governing body shall provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the expansion; and, (2) a public agency that operates an automated license plate reader system and did not provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the system (or before expanding the functionalities or uses of the system or the information it collects) shall, within 90 days, provide an opportunity for public comment regarding the agency's use of the system at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency.*

Potential recommendations related to BWC video review

5. *Law enforcement agencies should audit BWC footage specifically for language-related interactions to detect patterns and identify potential areas for improvement.*
6. *The Legislature and local legislative bodies should enact legislation requiring police body-worn camera footage to be retained for at least [x years] and requiring public and researcher access to body-worn camera footage collections for review and study, subject to provisions designed to protect active, ongoing investigations, protect individually identifiable personal information, protect privacy rights and interests (including legitimate privacy rights and interests of peace officers), protect data security, and prevent misuse.*
7. *The Legislature should enact legislation similar to Civil Code section 1798.90.55, subdivision (a), requiring a public agency that operates or intends to operate a technology-assisted body-worn camera footage review platform to provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.*
8. *The Legislature should enact legislation requiring that agencies operating a technology-assisted body-worn camera footage review platform shall not use the platform as a tool for surveilling or investigating civilians.*

Potential recommendations related to stop data analytics tools

9. *The Legislature or local legislative bodies should enact legislation allocating funds to State and local law enforcement agencies to procure data analytics tools that generate statistical analyses of the agency's RIPA stop data—including racial and identity group disparities—as the data is collected electronically, on a real-time, continuous basis, and require agencies receiving such funds to provide such the agencies' RIPA stop, and the statistical analyses run on the data using the procured analytics tools, on their websites, and to provide the data in a manner that allows for interactive use, such as filtering by time periods, locations, other variables, and combinations of variables, to the greatest extent reasonably possible.*

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