

# **CALIFORNIA RACIAL AND IDENTITY PROFILING ADVISORY BOARD**

<https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/board>

## **ACCOUNTABILITY AND CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES**

**May 27, 2025, 1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.**

**Subcommittee Members Present:** Co-Chairs Lawanda Hawkins and D.J. Criner, and Members Cha Vang, William Armaline, Angela Sierra, Chauncey Smith

**Subcommittee Members Absent:** Andrea Guerrero

### **1. CALL TO ORDER BY BOARD CO-CHAIRS**

Co-Chair Hawkins called the meeting of the Accountability & Civilian Complaints subcommittee (herein Subcommittee) to order.

### **2. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS**

Each Subcommittee member introduced themselves.

### **3. APPROVAL OF FEBRUARY 12, 2025, MEETING MINUTES**

Co-Chair Hawkins asked the members to review the draft meeting minutes from the Subcommittee's February 12, 2025, meeting. Co-Chair Hawkins motioned to approve the meeting minutes, and Member Armaline seconded.

Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Yasmin Manners of the California Department of Justice (DOJ) proceeded with the roll call vote:

- **AYE:** Member Armaline, Co-Chair Criner, Member Sierra, Member Vang
- **NAY:**
- **ABSTAIN:**

With four Ayes, the meeting minutes were approved as presented.

### **4. UPDATES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

DAGs Rebekah Fretz and DAG Martha Gomez presented the DOJ update. DAG Fretz explained that they would be providing an overview of the upcoming Accountability & Complaints draft section, with DAG Gomez covering the Accountability portion and DAG Fretz covering the Complaints section of the draft outline.

Accountability Draft

DAG Gomez explained that the presentation would include a global roadmap for the Accountability section of the draft, including the background on the emergence of civilian oversight bodies in the United States. DAG Gomez stated that the overview would cover the intended purpose for the creation of, and the community impetus leading to, the development of these oversight entities. Additionally, the overview would provide agreed-upon oversight practices based on the expert literature, as well as the impact of those practices on racial and identity profiling and public safety. DAG Gomez would also provide an overview of the types of civilian oversight models in California and how they overlap with models identified as effective or ineffective.

DAG Gomez first discussed the emergence of Civilian Oversight Bodies (COBs) with the Subcommittee. As explained by DAG Gomez, race issues were the impetus for the creation of civilian oversight bodies in the past. During the Progressive Era (late 1800s – 1920s), the first oversight bodies emerged in the United States, with a focus on addressing police corruption generally. These COBs suffered from a lack of resources and were viewed as a corrupt entity without objectives, and were not successful. In the 1920s, more formalized civilian oversight bodies in the United States emerged, as police tensions with communities increased. However, these entities also lacked the resources, clear authority, and jurisdiction to be successful. The 1930s through the 1950s saw an increase in civilian oversight bodies, stemming from an escalation of riots and uprisings over race relations with police and increasing racial tension between police and communities. In 1948, in response to police using excessive force against the Black community, the first civilian review board was established in Washington D.C.

There was a continued increase in the creation of civilian oversight bodies through the 1990s due to significant changes to policing and reform efforts. Researchers attributed this increase to continued racial disparities in enforcement along with media coverage of police misconduct and corruption. The creation of civilian oversight bodies continued to increase through the 2020s, particularly following the protests related to George Floyd and the subsequent outcry over police misconduct.

DAG Gomez also discussed the objectives of COBs with the Subcommittee. Over 98 percent of oversight agencies agree that the most critical programmatic goal of any COB is to restore public trust. A large percentage of COBs listed objectives such as ensuring accessible complaint processes, ensuring thorough investigations, increasing transparency, and deterring police misconduct as among their most critical programmatic goals. DAG Gomez noted that these agreed-upon oversight objectives do not expressly state the intent to reduce racial disparities. Instead, a reduction in racial disparities is implied. This means that experts in this field have not reviewed or analyzed how COBs can reduce racial disparities in law enforcement practices.

DAG Gomez also noted that communities assume that the creation of a civilian oversight body will result in public trust and safety, along with other objectives, but also in the reduction of racial disparities related to enforcement.

DAG Gomez next discussed the topic of effective practices of COBs with the Subcommittee. As explained by DAG Gomez, the metrics of whether a COB is effective are grounded in the

objectives of the oversight body. Researchers agree that the effectiveness of a COB can be measured using a number of metrics: the independence of the COB; whether the COB has clear jurisdiction and authority over what complaints an agency can handle; freedom from operational ambiguity; whether the COB has access to records and facilities; and whether the COB has access to appropriate personnel. Stakeholder support is critical when assessing effectiveness, as a lack of support can lead to open positions within the oversight entity remaining vacant or failing to fund positions, which are both silent methods of amputating the capacity of the oversight body to carry out its role due to a lack of resources.

DAG Gomez also explained that additional factors contributing to effective oversight entities include: adequate funding and operation resources; public reporting and transparency in the work of the COB; whether the COB is able to conduct analyses of the policies and patterns of the law enforcement agency; the level of outreach, involvement, and stakeholder support of the COB; and whether the COB can provide confidentiality, anonymity, and protection from retaliation.

DAG Gomez next discussed the research looking into the impact of COBs with the Subcommittee. Recent literature shows an overlap between what constitutes effective oversight entity practices and those forms of oversight bodies that lead to a decrease in racial profiling. As DAG Gomez explained, all COB models tend to reduce racial disparities and disorderly conduct arrests, these are situations considered to be high discretionary encounters. This means that all COBs, regardless of model or type, have been shown to decrease racial disparities by six percent each subsequent year they continue to exist over time. However, DAG Gomez explained that racial disparities do not decrease in “low discretion” encounters, such as deadly force encounters, across all COB models. Instead, research shows that only COBs that are considered more impactful, robust, and well-resourced show a decrease in racial disparities in these scenarios.

DAG Gomez also explained the three COB models that researchers look at: the Review model, the Investigative model, and the Monitoring/Auditing model. DAG Gomez noted that these three oversight models are not static, and can overlap. A fourth model, the hybrid model, can take features of the other three existing models to create its own hybrid.

The Review model is typically volunteer-led and provides community members outside or unaffiliated with law enforcement with the opportunity to review the quality of misconduct investigations performed by the agency. Typically headed by a volunteer-led review board composed of community members, they hold public meetings, gather community input, and facilitate police-community communications. Community members can review the work of internal affairs investigations, focus on the quality of the investigation, and make recommendations to law enforcement executives regarding findings, or make recommendations that further investigation be conducted. A strong feature of this model is the ability to increase community relations and trust, in part due to its buy-in from the community. Its limitations are the inability to conduct its own investigations, a lack of subpoena power, and a lack of full-time trained staff investigators. Lastly, as indicated earlier in DAG Gomez’s presentation, researchers have found that there is a correlation between COBs that use the Review model and reductions in racial disparities in “high discretion” encounters (or encounters wherein officers have a great

deal of discretion). However, in “low discretion” situations like homicide, researchers do not see a correlation between the Review model and decreases in racial disparities.

The Investigative model has the authority to classify citizen complaints and conduct investigations into alleged police misconduct independent of the internal affairs unit. This model can employ full-time staff, including professionally trained staff to conduct investigations and provides the authority to issue findings to law enforcement, to recommend or impose discipline and can provide a substantial budget. This model may be the most expensive of oversight models, due to organizational complexity and the reliance on personnel with expertise. This model provides greater access to law enforcement records and databases, and a greater likelihood of having the ability to subpoena documents and witnesses. Researchers have identified that the benefits of the Investigative model of COBs is that this approach may decrease bias of investigations into citizen complaints. Further, individuals conducting investigations at the direction of COBs using the Investigative model tend to be highly specialized, which may result in an increase of trust by the community. The drawbacks to the Investigative model are that there are additional costs due to the complexity of the COB. Further, there is the potential that the law enforcement agency being monitored by the COB will resist the COB’s investigations. Researchers have found that there is a correlation between a COB using the Investigative model and a decrease of racial disparities in police encounters, including decreases in disorderly conduct arrests and in homicides of citizens. Additionally, researchers have also found correlations between COBs using the Investigative model and decreases in both violent crime rates and line of duty homicides of police officers, reflecting the extension of public safety not only to the community member but also to the peace officer.

The Monitoring/Auditing model is equipped with the authority to audit, monitor, investigate, and review a wider range of law enforcement policies, practices & procedures. The intent behind this model is to conduct systemic reviews of police practices and to examine patterns in complaint investigations, including patterns in the quality of the investigation, findings, and discipline. The potential strengths of the Monitoring/Auditing model are that there are more robust public reporting practices relative to the other COB models; it is less expensive than a full Investigative model, and it can be more effective at promoting long-term system change in law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Potential weaknesses are the potential for community skepticism, as the overall objective is to effectuate change from the top by assessing overall practices and policies of the law enforcement agency, rather than by fully redressing the misconduct at the community level. The investigation and outcome are not designed to directly address individual misconduct or individually discipline officers. The Monitoring/Auditing model is similar in its impact on disparities to the Review model, in that researchers have correlated the model with reductions in “high discretion” encounters of disorderly conduct, but less likely to see reductions in racial disparities in “low discretion” encounters, such as police homicides of civilians.

DAG Gomez stated that the subcommittee could use the analysis of COBs as a basis for determining the status of civilian oversight bodies of Wave 1 and 2 agencies. Specifically, the overview bodies as defined may be used to determine what types of existing bodies there are

under Waves 1 and 2 and what features these oversight entities, they possess relative to the models discussed.

### Civilian Complaints Draft

DAG Fretz next provided an overview of the proposed draft outline for the Civilian Complaints section of the 2026 RIPA Report. This year's report will include an update of the categories of SB 2 data that were included in the 2025 RIPA Report. This data will be pulled closer to the end of the year, so that the Subcommittee has a full year's data set for analysis. The data pulled could include the number of misconduct reports from law enforcement agencies (LEAs), complaints from the public received by POST, including complaints that involve demonstrating bias, common grounds for certification actions initiated by POST, and LEAs with nine or more decertification actions.

DAG Fretz explained that during the last Subcommittee meeting, DOJ staff discussed how the SB 2 section of the Complaints draft would also include a geographic analysis of SB 2 data and outcomes. This will include a geographic analysis of SB 2 data with an assessment of regional differences and outcomes. The subcommittee is currently working on a model for geographic analysis and should be able to provide more information for the Board's consideration.

DAG Fretz also provided an overview of the Civilian Complaints section of this year's report. This section includes a review of four possible topics of emphasis for the Subcommittee: 1) a data analysis of 2024 Civilian Complaints; 2) updates on prior Board recommendations; 3) 2026 Board recommendations; and 4) if the Board desires, a vision for future reports which could include reviewing any topics that the Board would like to preview for the 2027 RIPA Report.

#### (1) Data Analysis of 2024 Civilian Complaints

DAG Fretz explained that this section will include highlighted data and trends related to citizen complaints about law enforcement. This data analysis will include an overview of civilian complaint data for RIPA Agencies, including the number of civilian complaints alleging racial or identity profiling, with data broken down into the nine required identifying categories, the disposition of civilian complaints, and cross-year comparisons. Inclusive of the data analysis section is an update on the disposition of civilian complaints reported by RIPA agencies over the past year. These agencies are required to report the disposition or outcomes of complaints to the DOJ.

DAG Fretz explained that this section could include the number of complaints that were sustained, exonerated, not sustained, or unfounded. This data analysis could also include a cross-year comparison to aid in the monitoring of LEAs from year to year and track any policy changes in complaint procedures that may correlate with the changes in complaint data. This year's report can utilize wave designations to allow for the same cross-year comparisons by agency size, and provide an opportunity to observe the differences in policies and procedures that may have changed over time.

#### (2) Updates on Prior Board Recommendations re: Civilian Complaints

DAG Fretz explained that the Complaints section could include an update on prior Board recommendations. As an example, last year during a Subcommittee meeting, the Subcommittee discussed whether to recommend the removal of deterrent language in complaint forms. The Subcommittee also requested an update on the case of *L.A. Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles*, which analyzes the constitutionality of Penal Code section 148.6. DAG Fretz explained that this update may be included in the 2026 Report.

### (3) 2026 Board Recommendations re: Civilian Complaints

DAG Fretz explained that the Board could also review other past recommendations from prior reports to be raised in the 2026 report. As an example, the Board could raise and discuss the prior recommendation of adopting a uniform definition for civilian complaints.

Member Sierra thanked DAG Gomez and DAG Fretz for their presentations and stated that the Accountability and Civilian Complaints sections of the draft will be strong sections for the 2026 RIPA Report. Member Sierra asked whether there is discussion among researchers and experts on identifying causal links between different types of oversight agencies and their features and the disparity reductions that they are experiencing. Additionally, Member Sierra inquired whether there is discussion or studies among experts looking at the Monitoring/Auditing Model as having a role in examining their own stop data and the disparities and trying to figure out what systemic issues may be contributing to the disparate statistics.

Member Vang inquired whether there is existing data on which California LEAs have oversight entities, and whether there is a particular model that these LEAs are using.

DAG Gomez responded by stating that DOJ will be evaluating civilian oversight entities of Wave 1 and Wave 2 RIPA reporting LEAs against the three oversight models under review, so that the Subcommittee can compare these oversight bodies against what the literature views as effective features of the oversight body that lend themselves to reducing racial disparities, especially in “low discretion” scenarios.

Member Armaline stated that it would be helpful to explain in plain language the actual powers of each COB model and what their relationship is to LEAs in the State of California. Member Armaline noted that from prior experience on these sorts of bodies at the city and county level, that they are largely advisory, lacking any significant power, and that there is a failure to clearly define the power and authority of the COB despite the language and analysis invested into the oversight body development. Additionally, Member Armaline inquired whether the research reveals relationships between the Independent Police Auditor’s office and existing civilian board models.

## **5. DISCUSSION WITH POST RE: TABLED 2025 RECS AND SB 2**

Co-Chair Hawkins invited members of POST to introduce themselves to members of the Subcommittee. Meagan Poulos of POST, serving as RIPA liaison between POST and the RIPA Board and Assistant Executive Director, and Annmarie Del Mugnaio, who oversees the Peace Officer Standards and Accountability Division (POSAD), introduced themselves to the Subcommittee. Ms. Poulos and Ms. Del Mugnaio attended the meeting to address and respond to

those direct recommendations for POST in the Accountability and Civilian Complaints section of the 2025 RIPA Report.

### 2025 RIPA Recommendations to POST

1. Develop guidelines to assist with law enforcement agencies in developing procedures to conduct adequate investigations into complaints alleging bias and guidelines that assist law enforcement agencies with aligning their policies with Penal Code section 13510.8 and the guidelines should also apprise law enforcement agencies on how to educate the public on ways in which a complaint could be filed, and in developing guidelines for investigating complaints about demonstrating bias, POST could consult with the RIPA Board.

Ms. Poulos stated that POST has agreed to partially support this recommendation, and that POST has already begun work in response to the recommendation. POST was tasked under AB 443 to create guidelines for the purpose of conducting internal investigations, specifically working on a definition of “biased conduct.” Further, Ms. Poulos explained that POST followed up in response to the recommendation by conducting workshops, held in March 2025, on developing a definition for biased conduct in any investigation into a bias-related complaint. Those proposed definitions will be discussed at the POST Commission Meeting (Commission) on June 4, 2025.

Ms. Del Mugnaio commented on the recommendation regarding officers who may have demonstrated bias throughout the course of their duties, whether those investigations included elements of determination, and whether the decision or actions by the officers stemmed from implicit or explicit bias. Ms. Del Mugnaio noted that POST, also in response to AB 443, is working to address this recommendation by examining how background checks of peace officers are being conducted, specifically looking at their social media and exploring different avenues in determining any demonstrations of bias among peace officer candidates. These elements designed to further internal investigations into a bias-related complaint will be added to the POST background manual.

2. The Board recommends to the legislature to amend Penal Code 13510.8 to include whistleblower protections for peace officers and individuals within the law enforcement agency who file complaints or report serious misconduct by fellow peace officers.

Ms. Del Mugnaio stated that POST viewed this recommendation as requiring no action because this issue is covered by existing legal protections provided under the California Labor Code section 1102.5. In addition to the whistleblower protections under the Labor Code, there are also existing protections for the reporting officer under the “abuse of power” provisions found in the POST regulations and Penal Code section 13510.8, where the person in authority of the agency of the reporting officer may be charged with an abuse of power complaint.

3. The Board recommended the addition of categories to serious misconduct that are harmful to the public but may not be included currently in Penal Code 13510.8.

Ms. Del Mugnaio noted that anyone can approach the legislature to add additional categories to the serious misconduct definition under Penal Code section 13510.8. Additionally, POST can

inquire to the Commission whether there are other categories that pose a significant risk to the public that are not inclusive within the existing nine categories under serious misconduct.

Member Sierra asked POST whether there is or are categories not covered under the serious misconduct definition that POST may be thinking of as adding as a category.

Ms. Del Mugnaio responded by stating that neglect of duty is a factor in cases that POST handles that may involve some wrongdoing. This is a broad category that arises when a peace officer may not have exercised their law enforcement responsibilities at all, placing the public at risk. Secondly, though covered under the serious misconduct definition, the expansion of the dishonesty definition often presents itself in misconduct cases, however the current definition under serious misconduct is very limited in its application, applying with the reporting of a criminal act, or crime in progress investigation of a criminal act, or if someone is under investigation for serious misconduct and is dishonest during the course of that investigation.

4. The Board raised the issue of the continuation of an Immediate Temporary Suspension (ITS) even if POST loses jurisdiction on an officer who may be arrested for a felony.

Ms. Del Mugnaio responded by stating the POST has not deemed this as a real issue, as on most occasions POST is able to retain jurisdiction of the ITS. If POST loses jurisdiction, it does not lose jurisdiction over the case. Ms. Del Mugnaio explained that there is always a risk of the officer regaining employment with another agency if not under the ITS. However, this is unlikely, as an agency that is considering whether to hire a peace officer is required to check with POST to determine whether the officer is under any pending serious misconduct investigation. Ms. Del Mugnaio explained that the only caveat is that there could be a change that says that the ITS remains in effect until POST completes its investigation into serious misconduct regardless of whether POST loses jurisdiction because of an initial arrest. This is not considered a concerning loophole in the law for POST.

5. The Board recommended that POST modify the existing complaint form to include an age indicator, allowing the complainant the opportunity to indicate whether they are 17 years or younger or between the age of 18 to 24 years of age.

Ms. Del Mugnaio followed up by seeking clarification of the Subcommittee's purpose in developing the recommendation, and asked whether the request for modification is to capture data at a data point for RIPA analysis, or whether the Board was looking to protect a vulnerable population.

Co-Chair Hawkins responded to Ms. Del Mugnaio by stating that the purpose would be for RIPA analysis and that the data is essential to the Board having a better understanding of how law enforcement actions are impacting young people in California.

Member Sierra commented recalling the Subcommittee viewing the intent behind the age indicator modification request as two-fold: first, to collect the data for the Board's analysis, and second, to assess the significance age may have as a factor in determining wrongdoing and misconduct. Member Sierra also noted that the Subcommittee wanted to review the drawbacks, if any, in pursuing this path to protect youth and gather data for RIPA review.



Ms. Del Mugnaio followed up on both Board member responses by stating that POST looks to prioritize youth and all vulnerable populations relative to determinations of the egregiousness of the action or inaction by the peace officer. Additionally, under Title 11, section 1213 of the California Code, the Commission takes into consideration the egregious nature of the act, the risk to the public, which includes factoring in the prioritization of vulnerable populations, including youth, the elderly, the mentally disabled as well as other vulnerable groups. Lastly, collecting data at these data points can be instructive in preventing future harmful ramifications associated with those negative interactions between youth and law enforcement.

Member Sierra asked POST whether the Board would have to go through the legislature to amend the POST complaint form. Ms. Del Mugnaio stated that an amendment to the complaint form need not go through the legislature and would simply need to go before the POST Commission. Further, because the complaint form is captured in regulation, it would take a regulation change to amend the POST complaint form.

Member Hawkins asked POST how to engage the community to identify non-codified harmful conduct that violates the core responsibility of peace officers. Ms. Del Mugnaio responded by pointing back to the earlier discussion involving those categories not covered under the serious misconduct definition that POST may be thinking of as adding as a category. Neglect of duty is an example of a non-codified factor in misconduct cases. POST sees this factor on a regular basis, and it reflects how POST considers in its determinations those types of non-codified factors that they believe pose a tremendous public risk or are a frequent occurrence that POST does not have the immediate ability to act upon.

Co-Chair Hawkins asked the Subcommittee whether there were any additional questions or items of discussion for POST, then thanked POST for participating in the meeting and discussing the proposed recommendations of the Accountability & Civilian Complaints Subcommittee. Further, she noted that the recommendations were grounded in real concerns from the community, particularly concerns for the youth, and reflects the Board's commitment to building a law enforcement accountability system that is just, responsive, and reflective of the people it serves.

Ms. Poulos stated that members of the public with an interest in watching the June 4, 2025 POST Commission meeting may do so by going to the POST website or alternatively viewing the meeting on the POST YouTube channel.

## **6. BOARD DISCUSSION OF PLANS FOR THE 2026 REPORT**

Member Sierra suggested that, in light of prior proposed recommendations surrounding youth, the Subcommittee may want to follow-up with discussion addressing vulnerable populations, which is inclusive of youth as well as other vulnerable population groups. Member Sierra suggested that if the Board maintains an interest in making age-based recommendations, that consideration should be given to those potential unintended consequences that may be in opposition to the core work of the RIPA Board.

Co-Chair Hawkins raised the question of what support, including financial along with other resources are being provided to those smaller agencies following the passage of SB 2 to ensure they have the tools, funding, and independence to comply with SB 2 and pursue SB 2 cases.

Member Armaline, in a similar vein to Co-Chair Hawkins's question, recommended that the subcommittee should follow-up on a geographic qualitative analysis of discrepancies of SB 2 data among those LEAs throughout the State of California. Resources are a likely causal factor in the disparities but a deep dive on this topic could reveal other factors contributing to the disparities among like sized communities in the State of California. This analysis should include a review of who is filing SB 2 cases, what issues are agencies running into in carrying out these cases, and what issues or obstructions are agencies running into in handling SB 2 cases.

Co-Chair Hawkins stated it was necessary to gather sufficient data and tracking system on youth, and there is a need for a statewide "effectiveness dashboard" to track the performance and outcomes of the State of California's civilian oversight agencies. This includes tracking the number of complaints broken down by race, with data showing how these cases are resolved. Additionally, Co-Chair Hawkins stated the need to amend the definition of serious misconduct, believing the current definition to be overly broad and lastly that greater community participation in the SB 2 decertification process should be promoted to ensure that everyone's voice is heard.

## **7. PUBLIC COMMENT**

Mr. Hylton of San Diego commented on the tracking of youth/law enforcement interactions, stating that a majority of those interactions are not captured due to the RIPA Board's decision against mandating field interviews as a reportable item. Field interviews are only reported in certain scenarios. It is also well known that the majority of interactions with youth are resolved by field interviews. Further, he stated that if POST believes and preaches that racial profiling is a non-existent thing, there is no reason to discuss race or racial profiling and to invite them into the RIPA Board forum to pretend to care about racial profiling, and that doing so is a waste of the public's time. Lastly, if the Board receives a large number of civilian complaints in one year, but zero complaints the following year, the Board should question why there are zero complaints in the second year. Mr. Hylton stated that San Francisco and San Diego are prime examples, as they had the highest complaint numbers one year, followed by zero complaints the following year. Mr. Hylton stated that the zeroes are unacceptable and should not be reported.

Ms. Wittig from the Santa Monica Coalition for Police Reform stated that it would be helpful if the Board would include a section in the 2026 RIPA Report that provides guidelines or best practices for local civilian oversight bodies. For example, recording and posting audios or videos of civilian oversight meetings on the local government website, additionally posting the minutes, text, PowerPoint slides of all the presentations of the oversight body within the report. The best practices should also include encouraging the conduct of these meetings in a manner that proactively seeks community engagement, including meeting in the community rather than a government or municipal building and employing a format that encourages interactive discussion.

## **8. DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS**

DAG Manners thanked Co-chair Hawkins along with Subcommittee members for the meetings discussion and stated the need to ensure that DOJ had clear instructions from the subcommittee going forward. The primary tasks for DOJ going forward are the following:

#### Civilian Oversight

1. Continue to develop the civilian oversight section including a chart or display to clearly demonstrate in plain language the power of each civilian oversight body and the actions they are authorized to take.
2. Utilizing data and incorporating analysis discussing the causal link between the presence of a civilian oversight entity and the reduction of racial disparities.
3. Looking into whether the civilian oversight can be applied to stop data to address racial disparities.

Member Sierra stated that another objective to be included under civilian oversight is ensuring that there are concrete ways that oversight bodies can involve the community, including promoting greater transparency and open meetings.

#### SB 2

DAG Manners stated that the Subcommittee agreed upon looking to develop additional analysis for SB 2 decertification actions for this year's report, including:

1. A qualitative data analysis, to the extent the subcommittee can do this year, looking both at the geographical disparities of SB 2 cases, and to the extent the subcommittee can, seeking to identify any systemic causes, contributing factors linked to these disparities.

Member Sierra recommended that, at a minimum, the Subcommittee should provide a framework for the 2026 Report, of the costs associated with carrying out SB 2 for LEA's and how those costs and potential resource constraints are being addressed by these agencies.

Member Sierra recommended looking at the impact of the collection of data points involving youth/age indicator so as not to undermine or make so narrow that it does not affect other vulnerable populations.

### **9. ADJOURN**

Co-Chair Hawkins adjourned the Subcommittee at 2:34 pm.