Legal Opinions of the Attorney General -
Yearly Index

Opinions published in 2016

Opinion Question Conclusion(s) Issued
15-1202 1. When the office of county sheriff becomes vacant because of the sheriff’s death, must the next election to fill the office coincide with the next state gubernatorial election, or may the board of supervisors call a special election to fill the office earlier?

2. When the office of county sheriff becomes vacant because of the sheriff’s death, must the county board of supervisors appoint a person to fill the office, or may the board, by not appointing a successor sheriff, allow the person temporarily performing the sheriff’s duties under Government Code section 24105 to continue to perform those duties until the election?

3. When a county board of supervisors appoints someone to fill a vacancy in the office of county sheriff, must the appointee meet all of the qualifications of the elected position, including county residency? If so, does the board have the authority to waive those requirements? 		1. When the office of county sheriff becomes vacant because of the sheriff’s death, the next election to fill the office of sheriff must coincide with the next state gubernatorial election. The board of supervisors may not call a special election to fill the office before that time.

2. When the office of county sheriff becomes vacant because of the sheriff’s death, the county board of supervisors must, within a reasonable time, appoint a person to fill out the remainder of the incumbent sheriff’s term. The board may not, through inaction, allow the person temporarily performing the sheriff’s duties under Government Code section 24105 to continue performing those duties for a protracted period.

3. When a county board of supervisors appoints someone to fill a vacancy in the office of county sheriff, the appointee must meet all the qualifications of the elected position, including county residency. The board does not have the authority to waive those requirements.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 94 		12/30/2016
15-1201 Should vacancies that occur in unexpired terms on the Banning Library District Board of Trustees be filled by the Riverside County Board of Supervisors pursuant to Education Code section 19426, or by the remaining library district trustees in accordance with Government Code section 1780? Vacancies that occur in unexpired terms on the Banning Library District Board of Trustees should be filled by the remaining library district trustees in accordance with Government Code section 1780.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 82 		11/03/2016
15-1103 May a member of a city’s redevelopment successor-agency board purchase commercial property located within a former redevelopment area pursuant to a right of first refusal contained in a lease that the member entered into before taking office? A member of a city’s redevelopment successor-agency board may not purchase commercial property located within a former redevelopment area pursuant to a right of first refusal contained in a lease that the member entered into before taking office.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 67 		09/02/2016
15-1101 Proposed relator DEBORAH ROBERTSON has requested leave to sue proposed defendant EDWARD PALMER in quo warranto to remove him from the public office of Rialto city council member on the ground that he did not reside in the city at the time of his reelection as required by law. Because proposed relator’s allegations regarding Edward Palmer’s eligibility to serve on the Rialto city council do not present a substantial issue of fact or law requiring judicial resolution, and because allowing this lawsuit to proceed would not be in the public interest, leave to sue in quo warranto is DENIED.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 74 		09/06/2016
15-801 Under the weighted voting system used by the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the votes of some constituent public agencies are shared among two or more representative directors who are present when a vote is taken. If such a board member is legally disqualified and required to recuse himself or herself from participating in a given board vote, how does that recusal affect the counting and determination of the member agency’s vote allocation? If a member of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is legally disqualified and required to recuse himself or herself from participating in a given board vote, the board member is effectively absent from that vote. So, if that board member is part of a multi-director delegation representing a constituent public agency, the votes allocated to the constituent agency are to be shared equally among the agency’s other qualified representatives who are present when the vote is taken.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 61 		09/01/2016
14-1206 Must the California Department of Transportation pay fees to cover Mono County’s costs for (1) inspecting, and preparing a report on, the Department’s surface mining operations as required by the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, and (2) performing other duties under the Act? The California Department of Transportation (1) must pay fees to cover Mono County’s costs for inspecting, and preparing a report on, the Department’s surface mining operations as required by the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, but (2) is exempt from paying fees for the other duties Mono County is required to perform under the Act.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 88 		12/30/2016
14-1203 1. Where applicable, the Ralph M. Brown Act’s regular meeting online agenda-posting provision requires a local agency’s legislative body to post the meeting agenda on the local agency’s website at least 72 hours before the scheduled meeting. Is this provision violated whenever the local agency’s website experiences technical difficulties (for example, due to a power failure, cyber attack, or other third-party interference) that cause the agenda to become inaccessible to the public for a portion of the 72 hours that precede the scheduled meeting?

2. If technical difficulties prevent a local agency’s legislative body from posting the regular meeting agenda on the local agency’s website for a continuous 72-hour period before the scheduled regular meeting, but the legislative body has otherwise substantially complied with the Brown Act’s agenda-posting requirements, may the legislative body lawfully hold its regular meeting as scheduled? 		1. The Ralph M. Brown Act’s regular meeting online agenda-posting provision is not necessarily violated whenever the local agency’s website experiences technical difficulties that cause the agenda to become inaccessible to the public for a portion of the 72 hours that precede the scheduled meeting.

2. If technical difficulties prevent a local agency’s legislative body from posting a regular meeting agenda on the local agency’s website for a continuous 72-hour period before the scheduled regular meeting, but the legislative body has otherwise substantially complied with the Brown Act’s agenda-posting requirements, the legislative body may lawfully hold its regular meeting as scheduled. Whether an agency has substantially complied in a given case would require an analysis of the particular circumstances to determine whether the Brown Act’s statutory objectives of ensuring open meetings and public awareness are satisfied.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 11 		01/19/2016
14-901 If a school district’s employment contract with its superintendent provides an annual cash allowance in lieu of medical benefits that the superintendent would otherwise receive, may the district expend an equivalent annual sum for each school board member to purchase an individual whole life insurance policy in lieu of medical benefits that each board member would otherwise receive? Notwithstanding that a school district’s employment contract with its superintendent provides an annual cash allowance in lieu of medical benefits that the superintendent would otherwise receive, the district may not expend an equivalent annual sum for each school board member to purchase an individual whole life insurance policy in lieu of medical benefits that each board member would otherwise receive.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 56 		05/06/2016
14-304 1. Under Vehicle Code section 22507, may local authorities limit the issuance of long-term preferential parking permits to residents only?

2. In issuing long-term residential parking permits, may local authorities distinguish among residents based on the type of dwelling in which they live—for example, by only making permits available to those who reside in single-family dwellings or small (two-to-four-unit) multifamily dwellings, and excluding those who reside in larger multifamily dwelling units such as apartment buildings? 		1. Under Vehicle Code section 22507, local authorities may limit the issuance of long-term preferential parking permits to residents only.

2. In issuing long-term residential parking permits, local authorities may not distinguish among residents based on the type of dwelling in which they live.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 49 		04/14/2016
13-403 Does Proposition 26 require voter approval before a county board of supervisors may enact an ordinance that would require a cable television franchise holder providing service in the county to pay a “public, educational, and governmental access fee,” equal to one percent of the “holder’s gross revenues,” to the county as authorized under California’s Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act? Proposition 26 does not require voter approval before a county board of supervisors may enact an ordinance that would require a cable television franchise holder providing service in the county to pay a “public, educational, and governmental access fee,” equal to one percent of the “holder’s gross revenues,” to the county as authorized under California’s Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1 		01/15/2016
13-304 1. Does a school or community college district violate California constitutional and statutory prohibitions against using public funds to advocate passage of a bond measure by contracting with a person or entity for services related to a bond election campaign?

2. Does a school or community college district violate California prohibitions against using public funds to advocate passage of a bond measure if the district enters into an agreement with a municipal finance firm under which the district obtains pre-bond-election services in return for guaranteeing the firm an exclusive contract to provide bond-sale services if the election is successful?

3. In the case of an agreement as described in Question 2, does a school or community college district violate California law concerning the use of bond proceeds if the district reimburses the municipal finance firm for the cost of providing the pre-election services from the proceeds raised from the bond sale?

4. In the scenario described in Question 3, does a school or community college district violate California law concerning the use of bond proceeds, even where the reimbursement is not an itemized component of the fees the district pays to the firm in connection with the bond sale?

5. Does an entity providing campaign services to a bond measure campaign in exchange for an exclusive agreement with the district to sell the bonds incur an obligation to report the cost of such services as a contribution to the bond measure campaign in accordance with state law? 		1. A school or community college district violates California constitutional and statutory prohibitions against using public funds to advocate passage of a bond measure by contracting with a person or entity for services related to a bond election campaign if the pre-election services may be fairly characterized as campaign activity.

2. A school or community college district violates prohibitions against using public funds to advocate passage of a bond measure if the district enters into an agreement with a municipal finance firm under which the district obtains pre-election services (of any sort) in return for guaranteeing the firm an exclusive contract to provide bond-sale services if the election is successful, under circumstances where (a) the district enters into the agreement for the purpose (sole or partial) of inducing the firm to support the contemplated bond-election campaign or (b) the firm’s fee for the bond-sale services is inflated to account for the firm’s campaign contributions and the district fails to take reasonable steps to ensure the fee was not inflated.

3. In the case of an agreement as described in Question 2, a school or community college district violates California law concerning the use of bond proceeds if the district reimburses the municipal finance firm for the cost of providing pre-election services from the proceeds raised from the bond sale.

4. In the scenario described in Question 3, a school or community college district violates California law concerning the use of bond proceeds if the district reimburses the municipal finance firm for the cost of providing pre-election services from the fees the district pays to the firm in connection with the bond sale, whether or not the reimbursement is evident as a component of the fees the district pays to the firm in connection with the bond sale made on an itemized service-by-service basis.
 
5. Where an entity provides campaign services to a bond-measure committee in exchange for an exclusive agreement with the district to sell the bonds, the entity has an obligation to report the value of its services as a contribution to the bond-measure campaign in accordance with state law.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 18 		01/26/2016
12-409 Does Government Code section 1090 prohibit an arrangement under which a contract city attorney’s compensation for providing the city with additional “bond counsel” services is based on a percentage of the city’s bond issuances? Government Code section 1090 prohibits an arrangement under which a contract city attorney’s compensation for providing the city with additional “bond counsel” services is based on a percentage of the city’s bond issuances.

Official Citation: 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 35 		01/28/2016